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Education Vouchers: Foundations and Prospects.
A Critical Status Report (April 1975)
Gerald L. Bresslour, A. B., Franklin and Marshall College
Directed by: Dr. Uilliam V. Fanslow
Education voucher p|ans are a form of educational fi-
nance through which educational funding agencies subsidize
students rather than schools. Students may spend their vouchers
at any school, within certain limits. The resulting competition
among schools is designed to improve educational quality by
allowing market forces to reward better choices and to penalize
weaker ones.
The theoretical considerations motivating current voucher
proposals are examined. The historical development of the idea
is traced from the eighteenth century to the present. Seven
alternative proposals are presented. The (Milton) Friedman
Proposal and the Center for the Study of Public Policy Proposal
are both examined in detail, along with discussions of the
criticisms each has drawn.
A field study was conducted in Alum Rock, California,
site of the only existing voucher demonstration at the time of
writing. The chief objectives of the field study are a com-
parison of the demonstration with the CSPP Proposal, upon which
it is modelled, and an examination of how the theoretical issues
have developed into practical issues at the demonstration site.
Uide differences between theory and practice are noted.
VThe field demonstration varies so greatly from its theoretical
model that it cannot be judged a valid test of the ideas uhich
motivated it.
Current legislative action on education vouchers is
examined. Although vouchers have not been popular among leg-
islators, the voters in New Hampshire have agreed to try a
voucher demonstration. That project promises to be a more
accurate replication than the Alum Rock demonstration.
A complete evaluation of the New Hampshire demonstrations
would indicate whether the theoretical considerate ns whic h
motivated current voucher projects are valid, an objective
which the present study was unable to achieve. Although con-
ceptual analysis indicated the validity of the ideas uhich
have entailed the use of vouchers, those ideas have yet to
be tested in the empirical realm.
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CHAPTER I
REVIEU OF CURRENT LITERATURE:
HISTORY AND DESCRIPTION OF CURRENT ALTERNATIVES
1
Education vouchers are the source of much current
discussion. As a pilot project in Alum Rock, California
begins its third year of operation, the voucher plan is being
hailed by some observers as the most revolutionary change to
visit American education in many decades. Agreement is less
certain as to the merits of the revolution ue are witnessing.
The central idea behind current voucher programs and
proposals is quite simple and straightforward. Under voucher
plans, the local education authority subsidizes the student
rather than the school. Each family with school-aged child-
ren receives a voucher worth the cost of educating a child
in that district. This voucher can then be redeemed at any
school selected by the parents.
Those favoring such plans feel that the increase in
familial options will benefit both the student and the educ-
ational system. Presumably poorer schools will fail to be
chosen and will wither away. Meanwhile, market forces will
bring into being educational entrepreneurs who will compete
with each other and with existing educational institutions
to offer more and better educational services.
Critics point out that such programs will or may open
2the door to unethical hucksters. Critics express grave doubts
that competition necessarily improves education. They often
hold strong reservations concerning the uses to which such plans
can be put in furthering racial segregation. Concerns have also
arisen that such plans might be used to break down the barrier
between church and state.
Before turning to a discussion of the merits of the
arguments for and against various voucher proposals, we must
place the idea in its historical context. Voucher schemes are
quite old and have been supported, and are currently supported,
by theorists who find very little else to agree upon.
For example, Adam Smith, the father of classical economics,
and Christopher Jencks, who has been called a socialist, have
both proposed voucher plans. Milton Friedman, the eminent lib-
ertarian economist, and Thomas Paine, the eminent defender of
revolutions, both favor vouchers.
Throughout this chapter the remarkable differences among
various voucher proponents will become evident. In general, two
quite different philosophical approaches can be discerned. On
one hand are proponents who argue from a free market, antistatist,
libertarian position. The statements of Adam Smith, 3ohn Stuart
Mill, and Milton Friedman fall into this category. On the other
hand there are many theorists of a different stripe. Their
3position is reformist, interventionist, and humanitarian.
Plans presented by Thomas Paine, Christopher Oencks, Theodore
Sizer and others fall into this category.
Adam Smith (1776) is generally credited with the first
expression of the voucher idea. Smith uas discussing the
benefits to the state*s commercial well being which the gen-
eral education of its citizens can bring. Always fearful of
the debilitating influence of monopolies against human
improvement as he conceived it, Smith noted:
The public can facilitate this acquisition
(of education) by establishing in every
parish or district a little school where
children may be taught for a reward so mod-
erate, that even a common laborer may afford
it; the master being partly but not wholly
paid by the public; because if he were
wholly or even principally paid by it, he
would soon learn to neglect his business, (p. 370)
Indeed, the charge that teachers have learned to neg-
lect their business is implicit in some dicsussions of voucher
plans. Needless to say, teachers are most resentful of such
implications, real or imagined. Teacher unions have been the
most vociferous, if not the ablest, critics of voucher pro-
posals •
It will be noted that Smith's suggestion falls short
of a modern voucher proposal. He suggested that the funds
for the support of teachers are to be only principally pri-
vate. However, the suggestion is only a step removed from
4modern proposals, which currently would have the state supply
funds to individuals,
A more explicit statement of a voucher plan came
soon after Smith from Thomas Paine, In The Rights of Man
(1925) Paine undertakes a defense of the then recent French
Revolution, His discussion led him to an analysis of the
unhappy lot of the poor. In the course of pointing out the
unfair tax burden carried by the poor, Paine recommended that
the government order a remission of taxes
to every poor family out of the surplus
taxes and in room of poor rates, four
pounds a year for every child under four-
teen years of age; enjoining the parents
of such children to send them to school,
to learn reading, writing, and common
arithmetic; the ministers of every parish,
of every denomination to certify jointly
to an office for that purpose that their
duty is performed, (p, 54)
No doubt the plan was considered too radical, involving
as it did the remission of taxes. Since the poor had no
representation at the time - only male property holders over
tuenty-one were enfranchised in England and America - it
is not surprising that a program so much in their interest,
and with no apparent gain for those in power, should have
been passed over.
Half a century later, John Stuart Mill proposed a
voucher plan for reasons rather different from either of his
two predecessors. Smith favored vouchers as an efficient
5means of contributing to the commercial welfare of the state.
Also, as a free market economist, he favored programs which
allowed for the free flow of private funds. Paine was
interested in vouchers as a means to expand social justice.
Mill (1909), however, favors the use of vouchers as a means
to limit the control of the state in the lives of its citizens.
This antistatist motivation finds its strongest contemporary
statement in Friedman (1962), although it is present in others.
Mill states:
That the whole or any large part of the
education of the people should be in
State hands, I go as far as anyone in
deprecating. All that has been said of
the importance of individuality of
character, and the diversity of opinions
and modes of conduct, involves, as of
the same unspeakable importance, diversity
of education. A general state education
is a mere contrivance for moulding people
to be exactly like one another. ... An
education established and controlled by
the state should only exist, if it exists
at all, as one among many competing exper-
iments, carried on for the purpose of ex-
ample and stimulus, to keep' the others up
to a certain standard of excellence. ...
But, in general, if the country contains
a sufficient number of persons qualified
to provide education under government
auspices, the same persons would be able
and willing to give an equally good educ-
ation on the voluntary principle, under the
assurance of remuneration afforded by a law
rendering education compulsory, combined with
State aid to those unable to defray the
expense, (pp. 315-6)
It is not exaggerating to say that no statement in
6favor of vouchers has surpassed Mill's in force or clarity.
The entire pro-voucher position is there in a nutshell,
written over a hundred years before the present controversy
got under way.
The salient points of the argument are reflected in
more technical prose by Friedman (1962). An educational
system run by the state will tend to become uniform. Uniform-
ity of education tends to cause uniformity of character.
Yet diversity of character, of opinions, and of conduct is
the hallmark of a free society. Therefore, let those who
can qualify as employees of the State become instead the
employees of individuals. Mill would have parents pay teachers
directly rather than indirectly through taxation. Our dis-
cussion of Friedman will reflect these same points.
No other written mention of voucher proposals was made
until 1926 when a Cardinal Bourne suggested that British
education could be improved through government subsidies of
the poor which would permit them to attend parochial schools
if they so chose.
In 1962, Milton Friedman devoted a chapter of
Capitalism and Freedom to a discussion of the role of govern-
ment in education. He and his son wrote a number of popular
articles on the subject during the next few years. By the
late 1960*3 a number of alternative proposals began to
emerge, no doubt stimulated by Friedman*s initial arguments.
7In 1966, Jencka discussed voucher plans as a means
Of providing equal educational opportunity to the poor and to
racial minority groups, Coleman (1967) expressed his belief
that programs designed to increase educational diversity
were urgently needed.
Sizer and Uhitten (1968) authored an article titled
"A Proposal for a Poor Children's Bill of Rights." They
argued in fav/or of a program through which the federal gov-
ernment could supply each family with $1500 in educational
funds for each child. This amount could be supplemented up
to a total of $4300 per child as family incomes lowered.
They argued that our goal should not be equal educational
opportunity but equal educational attainment for children of
all racial and ethnic groups. They suggested that the fifteen
billion dollar annual costs would repay themselves in unfore-
seen social benefits.
During the next year Sizer (1969) wrote another
influential article in which he argued for a free market for
educational services. Arguing that the political structure
and context of a school have an effect upon the quality of
learning taking place within it, Sizer suggested that by
giving parents influence in directing the school, students
would gain unforeseeable benefits.
Levin (1968) claimed that the public schools had
failed in their task and proposed the free market as the
8remedy. Lev/in presented a detailed argument in fav/or of
economic discrimination in fav/or of the poor using the device
of allotting to them vouchers of larger cash value than
those of the wealthier classes. In the process of presenting
his position. Levin made the first detailed criticisms of
Priedman*s initial proposal. The nature of his criticisms
will be discussed in detail in Chapter II.
Arguments in favor of experimentation with education
vouchers continued to expand in the late 1960*s and early
1970*3. Kenneth Clark (1968), writing for the Harvard
Education Review, made one of the strongest statements on
record in favor of introducing competition into the educatioal
system. He said, "As long as local school systems can be
assured of state aid and increasing federal aid without the
accountability which ... comes with aggressive competition,
it would be
. . . wishful thinking to expect any significant
increase in the efficiency of our public schools." (p.111)
Meanwhile a sizeable literature critical of vouchers
had developed. Fox and Levenson (1969) take the straight-
forward approach that the public schools have done more good
than harm and do not deserve to be eliminated or to lose
state support to what may be another educational fad.
Kornegay (1968) notes that voucher plans offer no
motive for improvement on the part of the schools. He
suggests that the most likely competitor of the public school
9system is the parochial school system. Since he feels that
parochial schools may be lower in educational quality than
the public schools, he does not foresee great gains to be
won through the use of education vouchers.
Lutz (1971) has indicated that free markets are no
guarantee of positive results. He notes that free markets
have not produced safe cars or pure drugs. Dentler (1971)
has pointed out that the poorest sections of a large city
like New York could offer no educational alternative to a
consumer.
Arguing against Friedman’s claim that educational
entrepreneurs will arise to compete for the vouchers of the
poor, Ginzberg (1971) points out that the necessary entre-
preneurial skills are relatively rare.
Selden (1971) has predicted that vouchers will cause
•u
money to flow away from ghettos. He fears that such programs
will divert attention from the real problems of schools and
children. Krystal and Henrie (1972) are convinced that
voucher programs will undermine the public schools, create
greater racial segregation, and violate constitutional pro-
hibitions against state support of religion. They feel that
reliance upon parental judgement in the making of educational
choices is unsound. Clayton(l970) anticipated the same
objections in somewhat less detail.
Shanker (1971) argues that once a voucher experiment
10
is begun, the process of its expansion will become irrevers-
ible. He predicts that public schools mill degenerate and
uill be selected only as schools of last resort. Shanker,
like Clayton and Henris, predicted that a voucher program
could nev/er be approved.
Each of the objections described above has been re-
peated in various other articles. In addition, a wide var-
iety of descriptive literature has been written. For a time,
voucher proposals were made with great frequency, each one
greatly similar to its predecessors. Each new proposal pro-
duced a rash of descriptive articles which attempted to keep
the readers of the various journals current with developments
in the voucher controversy. Such articles are useful to the
student of the history of the voucher concept and are cited
in the Bibliography. To cite each one here would appear to
serve no useful purpose.
By far the most influential work in the field of educ-
ation vouchers is "Education Vouchers: Financing Education
by Grants to Parents" ( 1 970 ) . Prepared for the Office of
Economic Opportunity by the Center for the Study of Public
Policy (CSPP) under the direction of Christopher Jencks, the
report discusses current alternative voucher proposals,
analyses legal and social problems, and proposes a specific
voucher plan to be used as a model by the 0E0 as it develops
11
experimental pilot projects.
The CSPP report distinguished the following seven
voucher models.
Ihe Unregulated Market Mod»l ( The Friedman Proposal)
In any school district, the total cost of educating
all children is divided by the number of children to be educ-
ated. The resulting figure is the value of each voucher,
every child receiving an equal share. Parents may supplement
this amount as they wish and as they are able. Schools are
free to charge tuition at any rate they see fit.
2) The Compensatory Unregulated Market Model
This model is similar to 1) except that poorer students
receive vouchers worth larger cash amounts. Parents may
still supplement voucher payments as they can and wish.
Schools may charge whatever the traffic will bear. In this
way, proponents of this plan hope to prevent better schools
from being bid away from economically disadvantaged students.
Since the publication of the CSRP report, a new
wrinkle has been introduced to this plan by Goddard and
Goffman (1971) which is introduced here for the sake of
completeness
•
2a) Compensatory Price Competition Model
This model is similar to 1) except that parents receive
a refund of some of the money they spend over and above the
12
value of the voucher. If the percentage of refund is high
enough and if the schedule of refunds is sufficiently re-
gressive, the plan may offer compensation to those uith little
or no money to spend on education.
3) The Compensatory Private Scholarship Model
Vouchers are distributed equally as in model 1).
Schools may charge as they see fit but must not discriminate
against those uho cannot pay. They must offer scholarships
to those unable to pay full tuition.
4) The Effort Voucher Model
Schools operate at four levels of cost to parents.
For example, four schools, otherwise equal, operate at costs
of 8600, $900, $1200, and $1500 per year, respectively.
Families will be taxed for the operation of the school system
on the basis of their ability to pay and on the basis of the
amount they have chosen to spend. Thus, a wealthy family
choosing the least expensive school would be taxed at a very
high rate. A poor family choosing an expensive school would
be taxed at a very low rate, or not at all. In any case, poor
families are charged less for educational expenses than are
wealthy families and receive equal access to educational
facilities. In this way, through a kind of indirect voucher,
equal educational facilities are cheaper for the poor than
for the rich. A very similar plan is called by its authors
Family Power Assistance.
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5 ) The Egalitarian Nodal
Every child receives a voucher equal in value to that
Of every other. Every school participating in the program
must charge tuition at the same rate, uhich must be equal to
the value of every voucher. Schools may not discriminate
against students in any uay.
6 ) The Achievement Model
The value of a voucher is proportional to the rate of
the student's progress in school. Those uho are gaining the
largest benefits from school mill have additional funds to
make even better use of the schools.
7 ) The Regulated Compensatory Model
Vouchers are distributed unequally, the larger vouchers
going to the poorest families. Schools may not charge tuition
at a rate higher than the value of the smallest voucher.
However, when a school accepts a poor child, it may keep the
entire value of the voucher. Thus, schools can earn addition-
al income by accepting a large number of economically dis-
advantaged children.
An Education Voucher Authority oversees the program to
distribute information and to insure that schools are not
practicing racial or ethnic discrimination. The Voucher
Authority redeems vouchers for cash and can refuse to do so
in the case of a school uhich violates any of the authority's
regulations •
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Each of these proposals has gathered or is gathering
its oun group of educates. Uhile it seems clear that each
position derives from a «.ll thought out foundation, it seems
equally clear that each plan uill appeal most directly to a
particular economic class or to a particular political view-
point *
Those favoring discrimination in favor of the poor at
the expense of the rich are likely to favor plans similar
to 3) the Compensatory Private Scholarship Model, 4) The
Effort Voucher Model, and 7) The Regulated Compensatory
Model. Those who oppose discrimination for or against any
group obviously prefer plan 5) The Egalitarian Model. Those
uith excess funds available for educational expenses and
those uho prefer non-public schools are likely to favor plans
like l) The Unregulated Market Model. Compromise positions
are offered by 2) The Compensatory Market Model and by 6) The
Achievement Model, each in rather different ways.
The next chapter contains an examination of the tuo
most influential voucher proposals. Included uill be plans
1) and 7) above. The Unregulated Market Model (The Friedman
Proposal) has been included because it is the oldest con-
temporary voucher scheme and because it has had the greatest
influence on alternative proposals. In fact, it can be said
fairly that every other current proposal represents a reaction
15
Of some kind to the Friedman plan. Plana 2) through 7) are
each different attempts to modify the impact and to redirect
the effects which their authors believed would result from the
unleashing of free market forces upon the distribution of educ-
ational resources. Finally, the Friedman Proposal has drawn
much fire from those proposing alternative voucher plans
and from those who reject voucher plans unconditionally. For
these reasons, the Friedman Proposal offers an interesting
field for study.
The other plan to be discussed in Chapter II is 7)
The Regulated Compensatory Model (CSPP Proposal). This model
has been selected because it offers the most comprehensive
correction of the faults perceived by critics in the Friedman
Proposal. At the same time, it seems possible that the CSPP
Proposal can offer many of the benefits claimed for the orig-
inal Friedman plan. Equally important, this model has been
chosen for discussion because it bears the closest resemblance
to the experimental pilot project operating in Alum Rock,
California. The Alum Rock project is the only voucher plan
operating in the United States at the time of this writing.
A further reason for selecting these two plans is that
they represent better than any other pair of plans listed the
fascinating contrast in motivations which is the historical
mark of voucher proposals. The Friedman Proposal draws
16
directly on the free market, laissez-faire
, antistatist,
libertarian tradition which is characterized, if not defined,
in the writings of Smith and Mill. The CSPP Proposal draws
heavily on the reformist, interventionist, radical tradition
characterized by Thomas Paine.
The major emphasis of the Friedman Proposal is the
remov/al of the perceived perniciousness of government manage-
ment from the schools. Equally important is the unleashing
of free market forces, a perceived virtue on the part of
Friedman. Uhile these elements are not totally transformed
in the CSPP Proposal, they are clearly not the same. The
chief emphasis and purpose of the CSPP Proposal is the
creation of conditions of equality of educational opportunity.
This goal is not necessarily inconsistent with government
management of the schools. The authors of the CSPP Proposal
uill claim that their goal is net consistent with government
monopoly over education.
Put another way, it is a premise of the Friedman Pro-
posal that educational resources uill be distributed unequally.
The rich can afford to bid the price of such resources higher
than the poer can afford to pay. This is the case uith many,
if not all, resources. It is a natural and expected result
from uhich Friedman does not flinch. On the other hand, it
is a prime motivation of the CSPP Proposal that such unequal
distributions do not occur.
17
Before turning to a discussion of these tuo voucher pro-
posals, it will be uell to point out that not all the literature
Uouchers is involved in argument, advocacy, and theoretical
considerations. The major exception to the rule is a formal
evaluation of the Alum Rock voucher demonstration undertaken by
the Rand Corporation (Santa Monica, California) for the National
Institute of Education (NIE). (At the time the contract uas
made, the demonstration project uas administered by the Office
of Economic Opportunity and uas transferred to NIE in a govern-
mental reorganization.)
The technical plan for conducting the evaluation uas
completed in 1972 and is titled "Technical Analysis Plan for
Evaluation of the 0E0 Elementary Education Voucher Demonstration:
Technical Dissertation." Some of the results of the evaluation,
chiefly those concerned uith attitudes of parents and professional
personnel, have been released by NIE in a report uritten by its
director, Thomas Glidden, in December, 1973. Unfortunately, the
main body of the report, though promised for early 1974, uas
not available from government depositories at the time of this
uriting (October, 1974). The results uhich are available uill
be produced in Chapter IV.
Because the Rand Study is going to produce findings of
major importance for future voucher programs, at least of the
Alum Rock variety, some attention needs to be devoted to the
technical plan used for arriving at those findings, uhatever
18
they may be.
The Study is an elegant piece of educational evaluation.
Its ultimate purpose is to find the ansuers to the following
five policy questions.
ln n,=
Uhat
t,
iS
-
the desirabi lity of implementing
some mechanisms whereby parents can have a
rhnH^
ireCh V/0iSe in choosin 9 the schools thei]c ildren attend?
2
.
Hou should educational diversity, esp-
ecially the creation of new schools, be enc-
ouraged by public policy, if at all?
3.. Should some form of public support forprivate and parochial schools be initiated,
and if so, uhat form should it take?
4, To uhat extent should ’Marketplace" in-
centives be introduced into education, and
uhat form, if any, should such incentives take?
5. To uhat extent are a) vouchers and b) the
manner in which vouchers were implemented in the
EEl/D (Elementary Education Voucher Demonstration)
a necessary and sufficient device for the
attainment of the objectives of public policy,
including those which are the subject of questions
1-4 above? ( p . 9
)
The ansuers to these general questions are deemed to be
dependent on the ansuers to the following six questions, which
are labelled "demonstration-specific."
1. Uhat has been the effect of vouchers on the education
of elementary students, especially the disadvantaged?
2. Uhat is the effect on the available range
of choice among school programs?
3. Uhat is the impact of the demonstration on
equality of educational opportunity?
4. Uhat has been the impact of the demonstration
on the economics of public education?
5. Hou has the demonstration affected the relation-
ship between citizens and schools?
19
6
.
on
Uhat has been the impact of the
social and political tensions?
demonstration
(p. 10)
The answers to these
information developed in the
systematise this information
developed. They are:
questions depends, of course, on
course of the study. In order to
,
twelve information categories were
1. Educational results,
2. Attitudes of practitioners,
3. Programs and processes,
4. Attributes of new schools,
5. Distribution of students,
6. Allocation of resources,
7. Financial impact,
8. Governance and administration,
9. Status of professionals,
10. Parent attitudes and responses,
11. Commynity attitudes and responses, and
12. Consequences beyond the demonstration area. (p.ll)
A chart is given (p. 13) which relates the six demonsration
specific questions to the information categories. In this way,
the plan can predetermine which categories of information are
relevant to the answering of which questions.
For example, the answer to question 1 will be derived
from information in categories 1,2, 3, 4, 6, and 7; question 2
requires information from categories 3,4,5, and 12; while ques-
tion 6 requires information from categories 8,9,10,11, and 12.
(p. 13)
Forty outcome dimensions are listed. These dimensions
are the smallest units used in the synthesis of information.
They are grouped into three categories — Political/Social
(thirty dimensions), Economic/Cost (five dimensions), and
20
Educational (five dimensions).
Examples of the first type of dimension are
o
* assessm ent of local schools,8. Administrative practices and behavior,
iq £
aren
!: °PJnions on integration,19. Parent mobility, *
29
* Sotinn
i
h
y
h
at“ tUd
?
S ° n ?° litical activism, andi/oti g be avior, (p. 14) 9
Examples of the second type of dimension are
2. Behavioral changes in educational suppliers,4. Changes in resource allocations, and
5. Changes in fiscal flows, (p. 15;
Examples of the final type of dimension are
1# Cognitive achievement,
4. Teaching plans and practices, and
5. Sociology of the classroom, (p. 15)
A second chart relates the information categories to
the outcome dimensions in the same uay that the demonstration-
specific questions were related to the information categories.
Thus, information category 1 is related to outcome dimensions
1.2.4, and 17 (Political/Social)
; 3 (Economic/Cost); and 1,2,
3.4, and 5 (Educational). Information category 4 is related
to outcome dimensions 1,2,3,8,9,11,12,15, and 18 (Political/
Social); 1,2,3, and 4 (Economic/Cost); and 3,4, and 5 (Educational).
Having built a ladder downwards from policy to information,
the process can be reversed once the information is collected.
Once the information has been collected to determine the out-
come in each of the forty outcome dimensions, it becomes possible
to synthesize upwards through the information categories, past
the demonstration-specific questions and finally to arrive at
21
answers to the broad questions of policy to which the study
is meant to address itself.
The technical plan for performing an evaluation of the
Alum Rock project is a magnificent edifice, a model of what
a "hardheaded" educational evaluation should look like. It
should be pointed out here that the present study is not an
attempt to replicate or duplicate the Rand Study. While the
purpose of the Rand Study was to find answers to some broad
questions of governmental and public policy, the purpose of this
paper is to compare theoretical projections of a voucher pro-
ject with an actual, operational design.
Something like this is a secondary objective of the
Rand Study. Early in the report, the authors indicate that one
purpose of the evaluation is the verification of uhat they
call the "Theory of Voucher Intervention." (p. 5) The basic
thesis of this theory is that "changes brought about by the
voucher arrangement will cause improvement in student achieve-
ment and related educational outcomes." (p/ 5)
A causal series is presented which generates the desired
thesis. It runs as follows. Vouchers will create parental
choice which will create incentives to create new schools.
These new schools will give parents an even wider choice of
programs. Since parents have a wider choice, they can gain con-
trol over schooling. Their greater control will lead to pub-
lic and private school innovations. The innovations will pro-
22
duce greater parent satisfaction uith schools. Increased con-
gruence between parental preferences and school outcomes will
improve students' cognitive and non-congnitive achievements.
The series is perhaps not as tightly joined as a chemist
would like, but it is good enough for its purpose. The question
remains as to whether the Alum Rock demonstration constitutes
a good test of the theory. The conclusion of this paper
a little further along — will be that it is not. For this
reason the beautiful structure of the Rand Study is going to
be wasted, since the information gleaned will have little to do
with vouchers as they have been discussed in these pages and
everywhere else outside of Alum Rock.
The nature of the demonstration project makes it impossible
to shou that vouchers are either a necessary or a sufficient
condition of the benefits produced by the voucher demonstration.
In the causal series given above, the statement "student^' cog-
nitive and non-cognitive achievements improve” is to be entailed
by a conjunction of all the other statements in the series.
If vouchers are a necessary condition of the desired
improvements, then failure to meet the antecedent conditions
should mean that the conclusion faili to obtain. In fact, the
antecedent conditions were not met. The vouchers used in Alum
Rock were quite different from anything used or discussed in
the wide literature on the subject. To say more about them would
be to get far ahead of the story, but the fact remains that if
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the expected educational improvements occur — and there is
every reason to suppose that they will — the claim cannot be
made that vouchers uere necessary to the outcome.
Of course, this is hardly a very damaging conclusion.
Even the firmest believer in education vouchers must believe,
if only in an unguarded moment, that educational improvement is
possible in other ways. Uhat is damaging is the fact that there
uill be no hint whether vouchers constitute even a sufficient
condition for educational success.
First of all, since uhat I uill call quasi-vouchers uere
used, all conclusions as to their sufficiency uill deal uith
them, and not uith true vouchers. More important, the Rand
Study uill not be able to demonstrate, although they may try,
that even quasi-vouchers uere a sufficient condition of the
beneficial changes, assuming that they uere actually measured.
Many of the qualities to be tested existed in the community
before the advent of vouchers. Of course, this is not the fault
of the study, but of those uho chose the site for a demonstration.
They may be forgiven if ue remember that Alum Rock uas the only
district in the country to agree to try vouchers. If the 0E0
had decided not to use Alum Rock for the stodgy reason that it
failed to offer ideal test conditions, there uould be no demon-
stration at all.
§
Nevertheless, the qualities uhich vouchers uere to pro-
duce uere already firmly established in Alum Rock before the
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project arrived. Parents uere already highly involved
school activities. Administrators uere happy, for th9
to have them so involved and uere anxious to uork uith
to meet parents' needs. Further, teachers themselves
the uish to develop innovative programs and techniques
in
most part
teachers
expressed
but uere
»
hampered by a lack of funds.
All these things came to pass uhen vouchers arrived in
Alum Rock. It may not be fair to claim even that vouchers acted
as a catalyst, enabling these hidden properties to emerge. For
uhen vouchers came to Alum Rock, sos did large amounts of federal
money to finance the project. These funds uere poured into
schools. The effects of large amounts of money pouring into a
poor school district aching to innovate can be imagined uithout
the technical mechanisms of the Rand Study. The existence of
the funds alone ought to invalidate the findings in the five
Economic/Cost dimensions and may uell ruinvany generalizations
to be made from findings in other areas.
The data uhich the Study will present will be muddied by
these considerations. Since NIE is likely to be impressed uith
results and not uith theoretical niceties, a successful conclusion
to the Alum Rock project uill probably mean many other similar
quasi-voucher projects. However, this need not be the concern of
this study. Ue uill be concerned uith comparing the project to
the theoretical concerns uhich fathered it.
Although the discussion of the Rand Study has necessitated
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anticipating our conclusions, the following points should be
borne in mind. Becsuse the conditions in Alum Rock produced
a voucher program significantly different from theoretical
projections ~ so much so that the propriety of using the term
"voucher" in describing it is questionable - the application
of the Rand findings to the "Theory of Voucher Intervention"
may well be inappropriate. Nevertheless, the Study may well
offer a recommendation to NIE that programs similar to Alum
Rock's are a useful uay of producing beneficial educational
change
.
To that extent, the purposes of the Rand Study and the
present investigation diverge. The purpose of this paper is
the comparison of a living model with its theoretical projection.
The fact that the Alum Rock project produced educational benefits
will be of little interest to this paper since our findings
indicate that the project is not a valid test of the principles
uith which ue are concerned. This same fact may be of central
interest to Rand and NIE.
The plan for the remainder of the paper is as follows.
Chapter II will present the Friedman Proposal and the CSPP
Proposal in detail. Equal attention will be paid to the many
criticisms levelled at these two proposals. Chapter III will
present the plan used for the field study at Alum Rock and Chapter
IV will present the findings. Chapter V will evaluate the findings,
review current legislation on vouchers, and look ahead at fresh
possibilities for a true test of education vouchers.
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CHAPTER II
TUO PROPOSALS AND THEIR CRITICS
Section 1
The Friedman Proposal
Critics outnumber advocates of the Friedman Proposal
by a uide margin. Because the plan makes no provision for a
guarantee that educational resources uill be distributed among
the population on anything resembling an equal basis, the plan
is unlikely to gather the support of federal government
agencies. Uithout such support, it appears unlikely that any
vouchor programs uill be implemented*
Therefore, our discussion of the Friedman Proposal
uill not assume that it is ready for implementation. Rather,
ue uill treat it as a body of ideas. By increasing our under-
standing of the plan, ue uill gain ground in understanding
the more complex CSPP Proposal, many of uhose provisions have
been motivated by a negative reaction touards the Friedman
plan.
The chief arguments in favor of the Friedman Proposal
are contained in tuo documents. Chapter six of Capitalism
and Freedom (1962), titled "The Role of Government in Educ-
ation" is the most important of the tuo. The second is "The
Case for a Voucher System" (1970) by David Friedman, son of
the noted economist. References to "Friedman" are to Milton
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Friedman unless otherwise noted.
It uas noted previously that Friedman fits easiiy into
the roomy category of laissez-faire antistatism. He count-
enances only a limited role for government. In his vieu, the
job of government is to enforce contracts, prevent coercion
of one citizen or group by another, and keep markets free.
A free market is defined as a system of exchange in uhich the
price of commodities, goods, and services is determined by
their supply and demand alone. According to Friedman, govern-
ments are never justified in going beyond this role except on
three grounds.
1) They may regulate natural monopolies uhich cannot
be controlled by laws of supply and demand.
2) They may attempt to equalize "neighborhood effects."
Friedman (1962) defines neighborhood effects as
circumstances under uhich the action of
one individual imposes significant costs
on other individuals for uhich it is not
feasible to make him compensate them, or
yields significant gains to other ind-
ividuals for uhich it is not feasible to
make them compensate him — circumstances
that make voluntary exchange impossible, (pp. 85-6)
Friedman offers no examples, but they are not hard to
imagine. A factory causes downstream pollution. It is not
feasible to make the factory*s owners clean the stream. In
this case Friedman finds grounds for government intervention.
3) Finally, governments may be justified in expanding
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their role for reasons of paternalistic concern.
Friedman concedes that it may be justifiable for gov-
ernments to enter into the subsidization of the education of
citizens on grounds of paternalistic concern. Although such
actions max justifiable, they extend only to general educ-
ation for citizenship which Friedman distinguishes sharply
from specialized vocational or professional education.
General education for citizenship includes the elements
of literacy, mathematics, a knowledge of history and of the
nature of civic responsibility. Government intervention into
this sort of educational activity is justified also by the
positive neighborhood effects of such education. Since the
ability of any individual to take on the responsibilities of
citizenship is clearly beneficial to others, the state is
justified in intervening.
Although it is in the interests of the government and
presumably of its citizens to subsidize general education for
citizenship, nothing that has been said so far indicates that
the state is justified in any way in manaqinq the education
of its citizens. The state may be justified in making capital
expenses available to schools and may be justified in defray-
ing the actual operating costs of education, but the actual
management of the educational enterprise cannot be justified
by an appeal to any of the three grounds for intervention
given above. It follows that the management and/or ownership
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of schools by the state is inconsistent with the antistatist
premisses of the argument as set out by Friedman.
Further, both Friedman's emphasize that it is right
and proper to allow schools to charge as much as they like for
the costs of education. This will supply those schools which
can attract money with the funds to bid for better teaching
talent and better educational facilities. It will also per-
mit parents who wish to and are able to spend more money for
better educational programs to do so. The state can guarantee
to all its citizens a minimum level of education. Those uho
are concerned with educational excellence and uho wish to
go beyond the legally required minimum will be free to do so.
Friedman conceives of specialized vocational education
as an investment in human capital. Although he does not
favor support of educational institutions or of scholars for
such purposes, he does countenance investment by governments
in human capital. A student uho wishes to enter a program of
professional training may apply to the government to invest
in his education. The government might demand in return a
yearly payment of a fixed sum or a fixed percentage of the
student's income for the balance of his working life. The
state will be making a good investment since the student's
payments will come to considerably more than the initial
capital outlay. At the same time, the student will have an
opportunity to achieve his professional goals and can achieve
30
a significant economic advancement at the cost of a relative-
ly small percentage of his yearly income. Again, none of this
entails that the government is justified in owning, managing,
or taking an active part in directing the education of its
citizens
.
Although Friedman agrees that many educational options
will be bid auiay from the poor, he also argues that many neu
opportunities will be made available to them. According to
Friedman, the poor are currently the victims of an educational
monopoly. The only real choice available to them is a
parochial education. David Friedman points out that such
schools are currently attended by children who are somewhat
poorer than the average child in public schools. Apparently,
parochial schools offer an option to the lower middle class,
but not to the truly poor. Ginzberg (1971) has pointed out
that for inner-city Blacks parochial schools are likely to be
distasteful on religious grounds, since most Blacks are Pro-
testant while most parochial schools are Roman Catholic or
Jewish.
As a result of these factors, the truly poor are
offered no options. They are constrained by laws and by the
whims of geography to attend one particular school. Ghetto
schools are notoriously ineffective and inefficient. Minority
group members, who are often identical with the poor, enter
schools at lower levels of achievement than their white,
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middle-class contemporaries and leave farther behind than
uhen they entered, according to Coleman (1967).
If racial minority groups, and the poor generally, uerB
directly subsidized by the government through the use of educ-
ation vouchers, they would be freed from the clutches of an
inefficient monopoly. Educational entrepreneurs, so goes the
argument, would be attracted to ghettoes in order to take
advantage of the funds being made available to families.
Parents would be offered a choice and could select a program
which seems most likely to benefit their children. Schools
would be forced to compete to meet the needs of community mem-
bers or go under like any other unsuccessful business enter-
prise, In this way, the options available to any family can
be enhanced and the educational offerings of the schools can
be invigorated by the rigors of competition.
The rich and the well-to-do would also benefit from
such an arrangement. Because they have more dollars to spend
on educational talent, the rich should be able to buy more
expensive educational programs, Uhat is true of any commodity
is also true of education. The more money one has, the more
options become available in selecting any product or service
in the marketplace. Although inequalities will exist of nec-
essity, these are less objectionable to Friedman than the
inequalities created by a slothful monopoly.
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So goes the Friedman scenario. A number of critics
have claimed that the plan will do more harm than good. Ue
will nou turn to an examination of their arguments.
Section 2
Critics of the Friedman Proposal
Hegel and Bhaerman (1971) take a direct frontal position
against the Friedman Proposal. They argue that competition,
far from being helpful to educational advancement, is likely
to be detrimental. They feel that competition may lead to
unprofessional attitudes on the part of teachers. In their
view teachers may begin to use methods which appeal to parents
and may pay too little attention to more professional aspects
of their work. If teachers can attract clients through the
use of attractive but ineffective devices, the quality of
instruction may suffer.
Further, they fear that students will be exploited by
a system in uhich schools may be reduced to rau and ugly
competition to find enough students to stay afloat. They
predict that teachers will be prevented from trying neu ideas
since school administrators uill be fearful of losing students
through an unsuccessful experiment.
Along the same line Lutz(l97l) points out that com-
petition has not led to the manufacture of safer cars, purer
drugs, or more nutritious food. On the surface the argument
33
is ingenuous since Friedman is not claiming that competition
uill necessarily produce safer schools.
Perhaps Lutz means to say that competition will not
lead to better schools. In that case the examples which he
has adduced are poorly selected. The last half century has
witnessed enormous technological gains in the fields of trans-
portation, medicine, and nutrition. Clearly, many of these
gams are due to the fact that manufacturers hope to capture
a larger share of available markets by improving their pro-
ducts. On this interpretation. Lutz* statement appears to
be false.
At the same time, it must be conceded both to Lutz and
to Megel and Bhaerman that product improvement is not the
only strategy employed by manufacturers seeking a larger mar-
ket share. Advertising can also be used to effect without in
any way improving the product. It is possible that schools
uill attempt to entice parents to spend their vouchers through
the use of advertising claims which may be untrue or euphemis-
tic. Although this may occur, this is not necessarily to say
that competition must produce such results. Rather it suggests
that regulations may have to be imposed upon the marketplace
to help consumers make intelligent decisions.
Megel and Bhaerman also object that voucher plans will
disperse available educational funds over a larger number of
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institutions, leaving less money for each institution to use.
As this argument applies to Friedman vouchers, it may be
false. The Friedman Proposal provides that parents can make
additions to their voucher allotments as they see fit and as
the price of desired educational programs demands. It is
possible that the gross amount spent for education will in-
crease as a result of the use of Friedman vouchers.
It is also possible that the number of dollars avail-
able for some classrooms uill shrink. If private schools,
parochial schools, public schools, and the schools added by
such educational entrepreneurs as turn up are all competing
for a total number of dollars even somewhat greater than the
current amount, it may happen that the amount available for
some classrooms uill diminish. As students move from public
to non-public schools, the former uill have to compete more
and more sharply for available dollars.
In uhat sense is this an objection to Friedman's plan?
The point of his voucher proposal is that schools uill be
forced to compete. Uhat is an objection for Nagel and
Bhaerman is a virtue for Friedman. His position is that
schools uill have to do a better job to attract a reasonable
share of a given market. Presumably, if public schools uere
doing a job which pleased parents and students, there would
be no shortage of funds for them when competition with non-
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public schools begins. Kegel and Bhaerman appear to be
arguing that ue ought not to have a contest which the public
schools might lose. Friedman, like proponents of almost all
other voucher programs, does not attach any sacred importance
to the existence of public schools. Dencks (1966) goes so
far as to say that "if public schools could not survive in
open competition with private ones, then perhaps they should
not survive." (p. 27) This is a hard line, to be sure, but
to dispute it ue should have to find some special virtue
which public schools possess which entitles them to their
current monopolistic position.
Kegel and Bhaerman point out that "technical, financial,
and cultural achievements of our society found their basis
in the public schools (p. 31)." They adduce no hard evidence
in support of this claim, but assume it is true* If this is
true, it may also be true that these same benefits could con-
tinue to be derived through public schools supported by educ-
ation vouchers. Presumably the virtue lies in the school
and not in the means of financing it. Friedman as well as
Jencks can argue that if the public schools are indeed res-
ponsible for such widespread achievements, then the same
market forces which reward l/olkswagens but fail to reward
Dauphines ought to reward the public schools.
Another critic, Ginzberg (1971), notes that voucher
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plana will not help to decrease inequalities of educational
expenditure among various states or among different local
districts within states. Uhile this is true, it is not true
that voucher plans will necessarily exacerbate the problem.
As long as communities finance education chiefly through pro-
perty taxes, the problem will remain. Further, the problem
is not due to the way in which schools are financed but to
the way in which the subsidizing agency itself is financed.
Recent Supreme Court rulings have upheld the validity of
using property taxes to finance education. Until the ruling
is modified or reversed, this issue is academic, (it uas far
from being academic at the time Ginzberg uas writing.)
Carr and Hayward (1970) find two grounds upon uhich to
object to the Friedman Proposal. First, they question the
validity of the distinction between the public benefits of
education for citizenship and the private benefits of pro-
fessional education. It will be recalled that Friedman felt
that government subsidization of scholars uas justifiable
only in the case of general education for citizenship. The
justifications he cited included legitimate paternalistic
concern on the part of the state and the desire to create
positive neighborhood effects (see pp. 18-20). Friedman does
not believe that the same considerations apply to the case of
professional or vocational education.
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Carr and Hayward argue that such
is unnecessarily narrow and restrictive,
the notion of citizenship and the notion
a view of citizenship
In a modern society
of useful work may
be bound together.
Apparently Friedman feels that education for citizen-
ship means equipping the student with the skills which will
enable him to vote intelligently and to understand the actions
of his government through the reading of newspapers and the
like. Carr and Hayward seem to perceive the citizen in more
direct and continuous contact with the agencies of the state.
His useful work provides direct benefits to others and in-
direct benefits through the creation of taxable revenue. At
the same time, the citizen receives direct and indirect ben-
efits through the actions of other citizens and through his
government. In the view of Carr and Hayward, all these ben-
efits may be lost if the state does not help citizens to ob-
tain desired professional and vocational training.
Of course, Friedman agrees that the state should pro-
vide assistance to its citizens in just this way. He feels
it is more consistent with the proper role of government for
this assistance to be provided through investment rather than
through subsidization.
Whatever the philosophical virtues of the two sides of
the argument may be, it appears that the position of Carr and
Hayward is closer to reality. Citizenship in our society does
38
seem to be bound up with useful work.
However, this v/ieu of citizenship is entirely neutral
as to whether the state should support the schoiar or the
school. While Friedman's uieu of citizenship may not be
accurate, this fact does not upset his position that the state
is justified in subsidizing but not managing the education of
its citizens.
Carr and Hayuard*s second objection concerns the
possibility that the use of vouchers as recommended by Fried-
man may produce greater racial segregation than uould other-
wise occur. As the price of good education goes up due to
market pressures, the poor will be forced to attend less
expensive schools. Since, in urban areas, the poor are often
members of racial or ethnic minority groups, it seems likely
that market forces will segregate races in the process of
segregating economic classes.
Friedman claims that inexpensive quality education
will become available to the poor. He expects that in the
ghettoes there uill arise educational entrepreneurs who will
supply the poor with educational programs of high quality.
Competition for vouchers of the poor, Friedman expects, uill
stimulate the creation of many innovative programs. Uhile
racial segregation may occur, this may not necessarily be a
bad thing in his eye3. Presumably, Friedman feels that such
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segregation is less evil than the influence of the state in
forcing integration on unwilling citizens.
However, Ginzberg (1971) points out that economic
theorists have long assumed that entrepreneurial skills are
fairly rare. If this is so, it is not reasonable to expect
a large number of new educational enterprises to spring up
anywhere. (Ginzberg does not name the theorists to whom he
refers. Presumably they do not include Friedman.)
Levin (i960), who argues for a controlled market,
makes the most telling points in this argument. He notes
that sellers of high quality education are not likely to
come to ghettoes. If education follows the marketing pattern
of other goods and services, he expects that the poor will
pay more and get less. Taking retail department stores as
an example, Levin notes that those of high and middle quality
will not be found in ghetto areas.
He further argues that it is unreasonable to expect
any services suddenly to spring up, whatever the quality.
Prince Edward County, Virginia, in an effort to avoid racial
integration ordered by the Supreme Court in 1954, closed all
its schools and instituted a voucher plan. Although services
sprang up for the benefit of whites, no educational services
at all developed for the benefit of blacks. Barred from the
white "private" schools, blacks simply went without education
until the Supreme Court found the voucher plan unconstitutional.
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Levin also argues that the provision Friedman makes
for private supplements to voucher payments uould quickly
bid services auay from the poor. This is a result which
Friedman seems happy to live with, since he is convinced that
alternative and cheaper services will develop in poor districts
But Levin points out that there is no evidence to suggest
that such services uould arise, and there is some reason to
suppose that they will not. He feels that the negative aspects
of Friedman's plan will materialize quite rapidly, while the
positive results may never occur at all.
In his extensive criticism of Friedman, Levin brings
still more arguments to bear. He notes that capital expenses
in ghetto areas are higher than in more prosperous suburbs.
As a result, a larger proportion of a ghetto voucher will be
spent on capital costs, A smaller proportion will be spent
on operating costs than uould be the case in a suburb. In this
uay, not only uill the poor have feuer dollars to spend, but
their dollars uill be less effective on a cost basis than
those of their uealthier neighbors.
Further, if a poor family could manage to send its
child to an expensive school, Levin uonders hou they uill get
him there, Friedman feels that payment of transportation
costs to and from school is not a proper function of govern-
ment, While the cost of school transportation uill not make
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a particularly large dent in a middle claea family's budget,
it is likely to amount to a sizeable proportion of a poor
family*3 budget.
Levin argues that the poor, ordinarily less sophis-
ticated in educational matters than their wealthier neighbors,
may have difficulty making proper educational decisions.
Friedman has suggested that the poor choose by emulating the
rich, whose tastes in other matters often become fashion.
Levin argues that the poor have no resources with which to
emulate the excellent tastes of the rich.
Finally, Levin notes an interesting application of the
law of diminishing returns. Friedman claims that an advan-
tage of his proposal is the feature which allows families to
supplement their voucher allowance with private funds. Levin
argues that upper and middle class children already have an
enormous educational advantage over the poor when they come
to school. Since their home life is consistent with and con-
ducive to high educational achievement, upper and middle
class children are likely to receive relatively small gains
from the investment of additional funds.
However, the poor operate at distinct educational dis-
advantages. They come to school behind their wealthier con-
temporaries in educational achievement because, as Coleman
(1967) notes, poor homes seem to lack some properties which
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are conducive to educational attainment. In addition, poor
children end up further behind their wealthier neighbors at
the end of their school careers. This fact has been blamed
on the schools. Levin argues that it is more reasonable to
expect that investment in ghetto areas can produce more ben-
efit per dollar than can investment in wealthy suburbs. As
social policy, he says, it makes little sense to use a plan
which will plow dollars into areas where they are least needed
Levin *s arguments strongly suggest that some form of
regulation is required in a proposed educational marketplace.
Nevertheless, his arguments do not refute Friedman’s central
claim that government management of schools is unjustified.
Indeed, Levin agrees with Friedman that competition can effect
needed changes in the operation of public schools. Both
Friedman and Levin expect that schools forced to compete for
vouchers of prospective students will lose the sloth character
istic of monopolies and will begin to innovate and to change
faster in more experimental directions than is currently the
case.
On the other hand, it appears that Levin’s strong
reservations concerning an unregulated market must stand.
Given the marketing pattern of other goods and services, it
does not seem likely that educational services of high quality
will come to ghettoes. It seems probable that the poor will
get the choice of the worst buildings and the worst teachers.
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This becomes particularly likely if it is possible for
families to supplement voucher payments with private funds.
Given Levin's arguments, it is reasonable to suppose
that our current problem of educational inequality will be
greatly exacerbated by a program of unregulated competition
of the type proposed by Friedman. The rich and well-to-do
will have more money to spend on increasingly good schools
while the poor will have less money to spend on the poorest
schools. Further, the dollars spent by the poor can be spent
less effectively than those of the rich because of higher
capital costs in the areas in which they live.
The Friedman Proposal is not designed as a plan for
social action* In the antistatist, laissez-faire tradition
of Will and Smith, Friedman was casting about for a way to
remove the influence of government from the education of the
citizenry. While acceptance of the Friedman Proposal would
insure that the American educational system could not develop
into a repressive arm of the state on the Soviet model, it
also offers little hope that free market pressures will aid
in equalizing the benefits derived from the educational system
by different economic, racial, and ethnic groups. It appears
that the latter is a more clear and present danger than the
former
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Section 3
The CSPP Proposal
Despits flaws in the Friedman Proposal, the idea that
competition can become a major creative force in American
education continues to find support. The CSPP Proposal rep-
resents the most extensive attempt so far to keep the positive
aspects of the Friedman plan uhile minimizing or reversing
its expected negative effects.
In 1969, the Office of Economic Opportunity requested
that the Center for the Study of Public Policy conduct a
study of current voucher alternatives. Titled "Education
Vouchers : Financing Education by Grants to Parents" (1970),
the report uas only marginally an examination of alternative
proposals. The main thrust of the report ua 3 a discussion of
CSPP conclusions as to the most effective means of organizing
voucher programs and a statement of conditions under uhich it
would be best to develop pilot projects deserving of 0E0 sup-
port. Several large appendices to the report discussed legal
problems relating to the possibility that education voucher
programs may result in violations of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. A discussion of these issues will be found below
in the next Section.
Chief architect of the report was Christopher Jencks,
a professor at Harvard University. 3encks* first written com-
ments on education vouchers, written in 1966, contained the
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often quoted comment that "if the public schools cannot sur-
vive in open competition with private ones, then perhaps they
should not survive (p.27). H
Teacher organizations have taken such comments as a
direct affront. The most vociferous criticisms of the CSPP
Proposal have come from the American Federation of Teachers
and from the National Education Association. Teachers have
not been alone in attacking voucher plans. Concern over the
plan's impact on the First Amendment separation of church and
state has prompted objections from the Anti-Defamation League
of the B'nai B'rith. Prospects of Fourteenth Amendment vio-
lations have drawn criticisms from the American Civil Liber-
ties Union and from the National Association for the Advance-
ment of Colored People. An opinion poll published in the
National Elementary Principal (1971) indicates that 43$ of
the principals polled were strongly opposed to the introduc-
tion of voucher plans into their districts. Another 23$ felt
that such programs would divert public funds from their schools.
Only 15$ thought the plan a good one, while 19$ had no opinion.
There are three reasons for selecting the CSPP plan
for study above others. First, it offers a much different
rationale and emphasis from the earlier Friedman Proposal.
It represents the latest statement in the radical interven-
tionist tradition of Thomas Paine.
Second, the CSPP plan is the most sophisticated of
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of current proposals. Many of its provisions foresee poten-
tial problems and offer solutions to them before they occur.
Finally, this is the proposal which most resembles the
voucher plan currently being tested in Alum Rock, California.
It is the only proposal upon which a working model has been
based
.
The CSPP Proposal is referred to by its authors as the
Regulated Compensatory Model. It is regulated by a local or
regional governing agency called an Education Voucher Author-
ity (EVA), which places controls on the marketplace through
the redemption of vouchers for cash. Schools which fail to
meet the EVA’s standards cannot cash their vouchers. The
model is called '’compensatory" because children from poor fam-
ilies receive vouchers of greater value than children from
wealthier families receive.
The EVA has the responsibilities of informing parents
of their educational options, policing the voucher operation,
and managing the smooth functioning of the entire system. In
accordance with Friedman’s earlier principle, the governing
agency handles the subsidization of students but does not par-
ticipate in the management of schools.
The EVA redeems vouchers according to the following
guidelines.
l) Schools must not discriminate in any way against
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racial or ethnic
for admission,
the total number
minority group members uho apply to schools
If a school receives fewer applicants than
of places it has available, the school must
admit all uho apply.
If a school receives more applicants than the number
of places it has available, it may admit up to half through
any means it likes, provided that discrimination does not
occur. A school is considered not to discriminate if the
racial and ethnic character of the students accepted is pro-
portional to the racial and ethnic composition of the students
applying.
Applicants not chosen by the first method are selected
by lottery. In this uay, every child has an approximately
equal chance of being admitted to the school of his first
choice.
2) Schools must charge tuition at a rate not higher
than the amount of the smallest voucher. This condition eli-
minates the possibility of private supplements to public
vouchers which many critics feel makes the Friedman plan un-
acceptable. Obviously, this condition is designed to make
the admission of economically disadvantaged students more
attractive to schools. Schools can increase their income by
accepting economically disadvantaged children.
3) Schools must have uniform expulsion codes approved
by the EVA. This condition will prevent the practice, openly
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feared by Jencks, of schools admitting poor students for the
value of their voucher and then expelling them on thin or
vague charges.
These three regulations are designed to insure the
following. First, every student will have an equal chance of
entering the school of his choice. Second, lack of money will
not deprive students of a good education. Third, once he has
been admitted by a school, each student has the same chance
to stay in.
The CSPP report strongly characterizes public education
as a monopoly. It notes that there are three arguments gen-
erally used to justify the existence of a monopoly. The
first defense of monopolies is that competition is technolog-
ically inefficient. Such an argument might be used by a tele-
phone monopoly, if such a monopoly existed. The second def-
ense is that consumers are not competent to make intelligent
decisions concerning a particular type of product or service.
The third defense is that competition will cause consumers
to maximize their private advantages in ways inimical to the
general welfare. In Friedman*s terms, the last argument states
that competition may produce untoward neighborhood effects.
In support of its own program, the CSPP report attacks each
of these arguments.
In answer to the first argument, CSPP points out that
such a position may have had application to education at a
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time uhen the nation was chiefly rural. If . community can
support only one school, then competition will produce only
needless duplication. However, the density of modern urban
areas does make competition technologically efficient. In
addition, competition may serve to remove the inefficiencies
which overcrowding has produced in the public schools.
The second defense of monopoly questions the ability
of consumers to make intelligent decisions. CSPP points out
that government support of a particular product makes sense
only if the government is less likely to make errors of judge-
ment than is the individual consumer. Presumably the govern-
ment can afford to pay for the opinions of experts and the
average citizen cannot.
For example, the drug industry sells products which
the average consumer is not competent to judge. The govern-
ment hires experts who see to it that consumers have only
safe drugs to choose from. In education the case appears to
be different. There is no body of expert opinion which can
prescribe a particular educational program for a particular
child.
Of course, the government may see to it that certain
minimum standards of education are met by each school. Par-
ents would then have a list of approved schools to choose
from. This procedure will insure that when a parent selects
a school, he can have confidence that his school will meet
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a g.ven set of standards, in the same uay in uhich he has
confidence in the drugs and meats he seiects. This is pre-
cisely the purpose uhich an EVA can fulfill. So far the
argument from parental incompetence has established only that
the market needs regulation, and the CSPP Proposal is ready
to concede that point uithout argument.
Uhat if there uere educational experts uho could pre-
scribe a particular type of educational program for any given
child in the same uay in uhich a physician prescribes medicine?
Uould this fact argue against a regulated voucher plan? If
the ansuer to the second question is Yes, then uhy is the
drug industry not a state monopoly?
The tuo cases are parallel. A set of experts makes
a prescription for treatment of a given kind to a layman.
The layman then fills the prescription on the open market.
No matter hou incompetent he may be, his choice is certain to
meet standards established by government for the consumer*s
own benefit. While he might be able to make a better choice,
he cannot make a bad one.
But if he could make a better choice, shouldn*t the
decision be taken out of his hands and given to someone uho
could make a better choice? This question sounds reasonable,
but it suggests something antithetic to the notion of a free
society. Suppose a man uishes to buy the most economical car
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Of a given size. Instead, he is persuaded to buy the car
which looks the shiniest, and this car is not as economical
as others he might have chosen. This individual could have
made a better choice and may uell regret his selection for
years to come.
The suggestion in the question at the beginning of the
proceeding paragraph is that the right to select his own cars
should be removed from our incompetent friend and handed over
to an agency of the state. Clearly, this is not the way in
which our society would go about solving such a problem.
Multiply our example by hundreds of thousands and assume
that the inability to select economical cars constitutes a
national problem. Such circumstances can be used to justify
government regulation of the marketplace. The government
might require car salesmen to post certain data in a conspic-
uous place in their showrooms. Alternatively, the government
might make such information available to anyone who requested
it. No doubt there are many other ways in which the state
could intervene to aid consumers in making good decisions.
One thing the state would not do is simply assign consumers
to cars in an attempt to prevent poor decisions from being
made.
The case just presented is perfectly parallel in
every logically relevant respect to the case of education.
Of course, education seems more important than cars and the
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defender of the public monopoly might uish to shift his
ground from the logical to the pragmatic. Even so. there are
many equally important decisions in uhich the state does not
directly take a hand. One's choice of career, selection of
one's spouse, decisions concerning uhere to live and hou
many children to have, if any, are unquestionably very impor-
tant. Many people make these decisions very poorly, yet the
institution of state control in these cases uould contradict
the notion of a free society.
The government does not interfere in many important
decisions of its citizens. This fact appears to reflect an
assumption that people have the right to make a wide variety
of decisions concerning their lives and the lives of their
children. Further, ue do not seem to feel that people lose
that right because they make their choices badly. Those uho
argue in favor of state monopoly in education uish to exempt
education from this general assumption. The proceeding con-
siderations indicate that there are no particular reasons
for granting such an exemption to public schools.
The third argument in favor of maintaining an educ-
ational monopoly is that the maximizing of benefits for some
individuals uill adversely affect the public good. The CSPP
report accepts this argument. It agrees that an unregulated
free market is uorse than no voucher plan at all. The report
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states that this argument is one of the reasons the CSPP felt
that the creation of an EVA was necessary. The EVA is des-
igned to prevent the seeking of private advantages from be-
coming public problems. Put another way, this third argument
is more properly directed against the Friedman Proposal.
The rationale for unequal vouchers weighted in favor
of the poor uas first presented by Oencks (1966). He claimed
that tuice as much money is spent on the education of white
suburban children as is spent on the education of poor, urban,
minority children. He arrived at that conclusion through the
following considerations.
The dollar amounts spent on education for each child
in the suburbs are roughly one and one-half times greater than
the amounts spent for each child in the inner cities. Because
of conditions in neighborhoods and families suitable to educ-
ational success, middle class children tend to stay in school
longer than poor children. According to Oencks, the average
school career in the suburbs is between sixteen and seventeen
years. In the inner cities, the average length of education
is between nine and ten years. The middle and upper classes
spend more money per year per child for a greater number of
years than do the poor. Jencks estimates that about $5000 is
spent on the education of a poor child while about $10,000 is
spent on the education of a wealthier child.
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Now, if wealthy districts and poor districts each div-
ide up their available educational funds and distribute the
resulting quotients among their respective students, it is
clear that poor children will continue to have less money spent
on their educations than do wealthier children. One solution
to this problem might be to have EVA's direct the affairs of
voucher programs in several districts, taking care that the
districts in each Authority's jurisdiction represented many
different economic levels. Such an approach has political
drawbacks, since wealthy districts will not easily permit the
value of their vouchers to decrease through dilution in poor
ditricts •
Another solution, recommended by the authors of the
CSPP report, involves direct Federal subsidies to poor districts.
To the extent that money is a solution to problems of education-
al inequality, this proposal will tend to level poorer districts
upwards. 3encks recommends that the requirements for eligib-
ility for subsidies be liberal enough for at least half the
population to receive them. He hopes in this way to induce a
large portion of the population to believe that they are re-
ceiving direct benefits from voucher participation. A number
of commentaries suggest a sliding scale adjusted heavily in
favor of low-income families. (See "Issues of Grants and Loans
..." (1971), Krebs and Stevens (1971), and Pollev and others
(1970) ).
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Section 4
Criticisms of the CSPP Proposal
One of the virtues of the CSPP report is the fact
that it anticipates and attempts to answer possible objections
to its voucher plan. In the previous section, three arguments
traditionally used to justify the existence of monopolies
were discussed. The refutation of those arguments may be said
to constitute a justification of the CSPP Proposal. Having
justified the plan, ue nou examine less fundamental objections
with a vieu to discovering hou the authors of the plan defend
it.
Shanker (1971), president of the American Federation
of Teachers, states in a highly strident article his opinion
that voucher experiments uill be "irreversible." He fears
that once pilot projects begin, there uill be no uay to end
the experiment, even if unsuccessful. Houever, the Alum
Rock project made definite plans to terminate at the end of
its first year of operation and presumably uould have done so
if support for its continuation uas not forthcoming from par-
ents and teachers. If the community had not uished to con-
tinue the experiment, the project*s directors intended to end
it. Since the project uas able to make reasonable plans for
this contingency, it is difficult to accept Shanker*s claim
that they could not have carried out their plan, even if the
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community had wanted them to do so.
Another union official, David Selden, urged the House
Committee on Education and Labor to curtail funding for
voucher experiments before they had begun. Like Shanker,
he feared that even the smallest experiment would grow like
"cancer.” The committee noted that it was unusual for educ-
ators to want to call off any experiments before results could
be evaluated and refused to do so. (See Beckler (1971).
A chief fear of the AFT and of the NEA is that public
schools will become the schools of last resort. They fear that
parents will flock to new alternatives, private schools, and
parochial schools. As a result, they say, public schools will
receive only those students who fail to be admitted to schools
of their choice or students who are so uneducable that no one
else will take them.
These organizations feel that educational funds are so
precious that they ought not to be squandered on what may be
just another educational fad. They would prefer to see funds
used to improve school facilities, materials, and teachers*
salaries.
It is difficult to assess these dire predictions. One
feels that they are not so much arguments as fears expressed
in the form of arguments. Clearly, no union wants to see its
influence wane. That is understandable. If one has faith that
in the long run families will tend to select those schools
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urhich are doing the best job, then those public schools uhich
are performing adequately ought to have nothing to fear.
Uhat is true of the unions is not necessarily true of
the teachers. The Alum Rock project continues to operate only
because it has the support of local teachers and parents.
Because this decision appears to have been motivated by factors
quite different from the ones under consideration here, a
discussion of its significance uill be deferred to Chapter V.
Other concerns have been raised concerning the CSPP
Proposal and ue uill nou turn to these. CSPP notes that the
Anti-Defamation League of the B*nai B*rith is concerned that
voucher programs uill lead to the abandonment of the principle
of separation of church and state should parochial schools be
permitted to cash vouchers. The First Amendment prohibits
Congress from adoption of any measure uhich may lead to the
institution of a state religion. It is not clear uhether this
prohibition entails further prohibitions against parochial
school participation in voucher programs.
Voucher proponents point out that no voucher program
uould involve giving public funds to parochial schools for
the purpose of religious instruction. Voucher funds are given
to private individuals uho may spend them on any educational
program that appeals to them.
Four Supreme Court cases are cited by those favoring
the institution of voucher plans on the CSPP model. In
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Bradfield v. Roberts the Court ruled that the Federal govern-
ment may make grants for the purpose of building construction
for a hospital sponsored by a religious organization. Houever,
the hospital uas funded by an act of Congress, and the legal
principles involved are too narrou for application to vouchers.
In
—
1
|
Ck Bear u ‘ Leu P
.G thB Coutt ruled that the government may
make payment of costs to a Catholic school on an Indian reservation
Again, the principle developed is too narrou for application to
voucher programs since the Court uas concerned uith possible
violations of a Sioux treaty and not uith church-state issues.
Everson v. Boar d of Education provided that states may
make available transportation to and from parochial schools.
Allen v. Board o f Education provided that public education agencies
may make their textbooks available to parochial schools.
Three recent decisions indicate that the courts may be
changing their minds on these matters. Ualz v. Tax Commission
ruled that government agencies must avoid all "excessive entangle-
ments" uhich might aid in favoring any or even all religions.
In Protestants and Other Americans United v. United States the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the lending of public
library facilities to parochial schools in fact runs afoul of
the "excessive entanglement" stipulation developed in Ualz
.
The barrier against any form of public aid to parochial schools
uas raised even higher by the Supreme Court decision in Lemon v .
Kurtzman
.
In that case, the judges overturned tuo laus : a Rhode
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Island statute permitting the state to supplement parochial
school teachers' salaries up to ISJC, and a Pennsylvania lau
uhich allowed the state to reimburse private and parochial
schools for salaries, textbooks, and other materials in some
secular subjects. The Court declared that such laws caused
impermissible entanglements of church and state affairs.
The Lemon decision is a major landmark in the develop-
ment of the Court's vieu on the subject of state aid to non-
public education. Its effect on voucher programs and plans
has been enormous. In Alum Rock, site of the only existing
pilot project at the time of this writing, administrators
have dropped all plans to include parochial schools in the
voucher project. The governor of New Jersey, who favored
state aid to parochial schools, vetoed a bill approving such
action through a voucher program. He felt that it was foolish
to attempt to implement a program in violation of the Court's
constitutional interpretations. A number of other states
refused to implement voucher plans following the Lemon deci-
sion.
It is not at all clear how much of this action has been
rational. It is by no means certain that when a family spends
a voucher at a parochial school, the result is an entanglement
of church and state. Is a voucher public money uhich local
agencies grant to parents, or is it private money uhich the
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local agency returns tc parents? The ansuer is net simple.
Examination cf a similar case leads us to the conclusion that
current reaction to the Lemon decision may be premature. Vet-
erans receiving funds under the GI Bill can spend these funds
at any educational institution of their choice. Such funds
are regularly spent at secular and parochial, public and
private colleges and universities. To the extent that voucher
payments offer an analog to payments under the GI Bill, it
ought to be permissible to spend them at any institution of
one’s choice.
Is the analogy valid? The ansuer to this question
rests largely on uhat the Supreme Court uill say. To this
date, the Court has not been asked the appropriate question.
If the Court feels that voucher payments become private funds
uhen a citizen receives them, it might rule that payment of
such funds to parochial schools is permissible. If the Court
feels that such funds remain public even uhen in the hands of
private citizens, it uill make the opposite ruling. Until a
case involving actual voucher payments to parochial schools
is brought before the Court, any decision that such action is
unconstitutional must be deemed premature.
Should it happen that the Court rules that support of
students uho uish to attend parochial schools involves "ex-
cessive entanglement," this ruling uould limit the choices
available to some families uithout damaging the central prin-
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ciplBs Of voucher programs. Kornegay (I960), in an article
critical of voucher plana, points out that parochial schools
may not represent any improvement over public schools. If
that is so, then limiting the range of choice to exclude par-
ochial schools ought not to affect the basic benefits which
proponents of the plan have claimed for it*
The CSPP report notes that both the ACLU and the NAACP
both have strong reservations concerning the legality of
voucher programs. Both organizations feel that such programs
serve or may serve to promote racial segregation through
the use of public funds. In fact, the very first voucher
programs were begun in Southern states in an effort to cir-
cumvent the 1954 desegregation ruling of the Supreme Court.
The program developed in Prince Eduard County, Virginia has
been mentioned briefly in this regard (see p. 39).
According to the CSPP report, the Supreme Court has
ruled that vouchers whose purpose is to aid any school organ-
ized for the purpose of excluding children on the basis of
race are unconstitutional. This ruling was made in direct
response to voucher plans like the one in Prince Eduard
County.
In addition, the CSPP feels that any voucher program
whose probable or actual effect is to aid schools organized
for purposes of racial segregation is probably unconstitutional.
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Although the program itself may not be designed to create or
to maintain segregated educational facilities, if these results
are in fact obtained it seems likely that the Court uill find
against the v/oucher program.
CSPP points out that the regulatory function of the
E\/A is designed to avoid just such occurences. The EVA can
refuse to support any school by refusing to cash its vouchers
if the agency can present reasons for believing that the school
has practiced racial discrimination in the selection of its
students.
The possibility of discrimination does not arise un-
less a school or program has received more applicants than it
can reasonably provide for. Unless such oversubscription
occurs, the school must admit anyone uho applies or lose its
EVA support.
Uhen oversubscription does occur, schools must admit
at least half their students by lottery. Presumably the laus
of probability uill insure that the racial and ethnic compos-
ition of the group admitted uill be proportional to the racial
and ethnic composition of the group applying.
Students not selected by lottery must be selected in
proportion to the racial and ethnic makeup of the group of
applicants, although schools may use any other criteria they
like for this group. (It is not clear in the report uhether
this group is to be chosen in proportion to the composition
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of the remaining group or of the original group.)
In case economic segregation should coincide with
intended or apparent racial segregation, all schools must
charge tuition at a rate not greater than the amount of the
smallest voucher. This provision is intended to insure that
every student has the ability to pay the cost of his education.
Given these conditions, it appears that racial dis-
crimination will be very hard to achieve in a regulated voucher
plan unless nearly all the participants want to segregate them-
selves. If members of different racial groups choose to
attend separate schools, racial segregation will occur. It
is not clear that such conditions would violate the Fourteenth
Amendment or the 1954 desegregation decision.
These considerations appear to weigh heavily in favor
of the CSPP Proposal. Vouchers appear to offer equal educ-
ational opportunity to members of each racial group. At the
same time it is doubtful that they will lead to a breakdown
of the separation of church and state. Even if the Supreme
Court rules to the contrary, this will not necessarily be a
major blow to voucher proponents. The CSPP Proposal seems
able to deal with the objections we have examined.
There are reasons to believe that education vouchers
can achieve the goals claimed for them. These reasons do not
constitute a guarantee. The remainder of this paper will ex-
amine the Alum Rock pilot project to determine to what extent,
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if any, the realities of educational practice are bearing out
the expectations of educational theory.
Section 5
Summary
The material in this Chapter is sufficiently varied to
warrant the inclusion of a summary.
Friedman has argued that the state is justified in sub-
sidizing general education for citizenship but not in managing
it. Against this position Lutz and Megel and Bhaerman have
disputed the benefits of the competition which will result from
withdrawal of state support for the public schools. Ue have
seen that their arguments have not been borne out by the history
of free markets.
Ginzberg's objection that Friedman's plan will not decrease
inequalities among rich and poor school districts is valid, but
is also academic in light of the fact that the Supreme Court
has ruled that such inequalities are permissible.
Carr and Hayward have two objections to Friedman's plan.
They dispute the distinction between general education for cit-
izenship and vocational or professional education. They also
claim that Friedman vouchers will tend to augment racial seg-
regation •
Their first objection appears to be valid. However, the
view that no proper distinction can be drawn between the two
types of education is completely consistent with the view that
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governments should subsidize but not manage education.
Their second objection seems stronger. Friedman's plan
seems capable of creating economic segregation which may be the
same as creating racial segregation, at least in many urban
areas
.
Friedman's claim that inexpensive quality education will
become available in ghettoes is disputed by Ginzberg. If valid,
Ginzberg's claim and Carr and Hayward's second claim constitute
a strong objection to the advisability of implementing the
Friedman Proposal.
The most telling points in this debate are made by Levin,
who rejects Friedman vouchers in favor of a controlled market-
place. He notes that the marketing procedures and patterns
of other goods and services have not brought quality products
to the ghettoes. He doubts that education of any quality will
suddenly spring up and notes the experience of Prince Edward
County, \Jirginia as a precedent.
Uhile these hoped-for positive results of Friedman's plan
will be a long time developing, Levin argues that the expected
negative results would develop rapidly. He expects, as does
Friedman, that educational services will be bid away from the
poor
.
will
Levin also argues that capital expenditure in
be more effective, since the outcome per dollar
,
Difficulties with transportation
ghettoes
spent
costs and withshould be greater
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UUh d6CiSi0n makin9 b* *». unsophisticated poor are still other
problems
.
Levin's arguments strongly suggest that an unregulated
educational marketplace can create great disadvantages for those
uho can bear them least well. However, the essence of Friedman's
position - that the government has no business in the management
of the education of its citizens - can survive intact in a re-
gulated educational marketplace. At the same time, the harsh
edges of Friedman's laissez
-faire doctrine can be blunted.
The C5PP Proposal is an attempt to build a model of such
a regulated plan. Characterising public education as a monopoly,
the authors of the report ask if this monopoly can be justified
by any of the three arguments used to justify the existence of
monopolies in other fields.
The first argument is that the monopoly is technologically
inefficient. Uhile this may have been true of rural communities
which could only support one school, the authors reject its
application to tightly packed urban areas where it may well be
more effective to have many schools competing in a given area.
The second defense of monopoly questions the ability of
consumers to make intelligent decisions* In expanding the position
given by the CSPP, we have noted that the inability of consumers
to make intelligent decisions is an argument for regulation and
inspection but not for state monopoly. The drug industry was
presented as an analog which is regulated but not monopolized.
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On further examination, ue find that the notion that
a person loses his right to decide an important question for
himself because he lacks, or even ignores, expert opinion is
antithetical to principles of a free society. People may often
choose their houses, their cars, occupations, and spouses badly,
yet they are not assigned houses, cars, occupations, and spouses
in the way in uhich they are assigned to public schools.
The conclusion of this discussion uas that education
should be maintained as a state monopoly only if there is some
compelling feature uhich distinguishes it from the cases described.
There does not appear to be any such feature and therefore no
reason for granting an exemption from the rigors of competition
to public education.
The third argument in favor of maintaining a monopoly is
that the attempt by some individuals to maximize benefits for
themselves uill adversely affect the public good. The CSPP
report accepts this argument, but claims that it tends to sup-
port not monopoly but regulation. On this basis, the argument
is more properly directed against the Friedman Proposal.
Other, less fundamental, objections uere examined.
Shanker claimed that voucher experiments are irreversible and
that once an experiment begins, there uill be no uay to prevent
its spread, even if, as he believes, the experiment is unsuccessful.
This argument is rejected more or less out of hand. Other union
officials have claimed that vouchers uill cause funds to flou
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auay from the public schools. Houever, it seems clear that if
public schools are performing well, there ought to be no fear
for their future under competition. On the other hand, if they
aren't doing well, competition may be of some benefit to the
clients
,
if not to the schools*
The question as to whether voucher programs which include
parochial schools run afoul of the First Amendment was discussed.
A number of court decisions were presented to illustrate both
sides of the question. A judgement on this issue must be held
in abeyance since the various decisions can be explained on
principles too narrow to be of use in a discussion of vouchers.
The critical question seems to be whether voucher funds
when they pass from parents to schools are public monies or
private. An analogy is drawn to the use of funds made under the
GI Bill where they are treated as private funds and can be used
in financing parochial education. No doubt other analogies could
be drawn to indicate that the funds are still public. Until
there is a more definite ruling in the courts on this matter,
the issue cannot be settled on a reasonable basis.
A final issue is the use of vouchers for furthering racial
segregation in schools. An examination of the elements of the
CSPP Proposal designed to eliminate such possibilities indicated
thay they are adequate to their task.
Having summarized the discussion in this Chapter, we
turn to an examination of the field study and its findings.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY OF THE FIELD STUDY
The objectives of the field study are the foliouing:
1. A comparison of operational and administrative pro-
cedures employed by the pilot project uith project specific-
ations presented by CSPP to the 0E0 at the beginning of the
project’s planning stage,
2. Through interviews, an examination of attitudes of
project participants to determine in what way the theoretical
issues discussed in Chapters I and II have been translated
to the realities of the pilot project,
3. An assessment of the status of the foliouing issues;
a. Have families demonstrated a capacity to make
educational choices on a rational basis?
b. Has the existence of competition created greater
diversity in the schools?
c. Have the roles of teachers and principals been
changed as a result of participation in the pilot project
and if so, hou?
Fulfillment of these objectives will be met in the
following ways, (The objectives are repeated for convenience,)
Objective 1, A comparison of operational and administ-
rative procedures employed by the pilot project uith project
specifications presented by CSPP to the 0E0 at the beginning
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of the project's planning stage.
Procedure: The project director will be interviewed
and will be questioned concerning the comparison. The CSPP
presented twelve specifications. Each one will form the basis
of a question or series of questions until a determination
can be made as to the project's fulfillment of that specific-
ation* (The twelve specifications with accompanying rationale
are printed below for reference.)
1 • The pilot project should remain in operation for
five to eight years before expanding the program.
Rationale: The project should not be expanded if there
are any major flaws in it. A complete evaluation which can
include assessments of the project's impact upon development
of equal educational opportunity cannot be prepared on an
accurate basis before five year's time.
2. Before beginning the project there should be a
year long planning period.
Rationale: Many technical difficulties are to be ex-
pected. These include use and scheduling of busses, prepar-
ation of teachers, development of information services for
parents, and the like. The project should not begin until
all such technical problems can be met.
3. The population of the area should be heterogeneous.
Rationale: One expected effect of vouchers is an in-
crease in integration of various racial and ethnic groups.
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If the project area contains many such groups it will be poss-
ible to assess the impact of vouchers upon their integration
or segregation as it develops.
4. The area in each project should include only one
municipality.
Rationale: Political factors are likely to be strong
in any voucher experiment. If more than one municipality is
involved
,
these factors may become more important than the
basic educational issues involved. In addition, evaluation
of each municipality *s development will become impossibly com-
plicated if both are involved in the same project.
5. There should be local private schools willing to
participate in the program.
Rationale: One of the purposes of the experiment is to
offer many alternatives to parents in an effort to create a
regulated free market. If only public schools participate,
many educationally interesting choices will be lost to parents.
Uhat happens in such a foreshortened market place may not be
as significant as it might be.
6. The program should extend through grads six, but
not above.
Rationale: For reasons of purity of experimental design,
the effects of vouchers should be evaluated for elementary
education before a project is begun at the secondary level.
Once conclusions can be drawn about the initial experiment.
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it can be extended to other educational lev/els,
7. All children of appropriate age should be eligible
to participate in the program.
Rationale: Results may be distorted if certain seg-
ments of the school population are not permitted to participate.
Since the objective of the experiment is to simulate free
market conditions, all eligible students must be permitted to
participate.
8. Schools should be permitted to fill a limited
number of places any uay they like, but must not discriminate
in doing so.
Rationale: Aside from reasons presented in Chapter II
(see pp. 46-7, 62), this provision also helps to equalize the
differing admission procedures of public schools, which have
none, and private schools, which are often quite selective.
The public school is given some of the autonomy of the private
school, while it in turn loses 3ome of its flexibility through
the following provision.
9. Schools should be required to fill one-half their
places by lottery.
Rationale: This provision complements specification 8.
It also helps to insure that racial or ethnic discrimination
cannot occur.
10. There should be no arbitrary expulsions.
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Rationale: This provision prevents the possibility that
schools Dili admit students only for the value of their vouchers
and then expel them for spurious reasons.
11. There should be an Education Voucher Authority
(EVA) to administer the program.
Rationale: The reasons for this provision are presented
on pp. 46-8.
12. EVA should collect and distribute information about
schools as necessary.
Rationale: This provision is designed to help parents
make rational choices among the schools and programs available.
Objective 2. Through interviews, an examination of
attitudes of project participants to determine in what way
the theoretical issues discussed in Chapters I and II have been
translated by the realities of the pilot project.
Procedure: There are tuo groups with whose theoretical
views we will be concerned. The first is the administrative
staff of the project. The second is - the staff of the local
California Teachers* Association.
The first part of the interview with the administrative
staff, particularly the project director, will be taken up
with fulfillment of Objective 1. Should it happen that the
project does not meet some specifications, the next set of
questions will deal with the significance of this fact,
set of questions will attempt to determine the director's
A third
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vieus and the v/iews of his staff concerning the impact of
the project on the educational enterprise in the community.
Some of this discussion will involve fulfillment of Objective
3 (see below). Much of this section will consist of presenting
to interviewees objections discussed in Chapters I and II and
practical arguments gathered from other project participants.
It is assumed that the project staff will think the project a
good one and objections will be used to determine their reasons
for thinking so.
The second group to be interviewed in fulfillment of
Objective 2 are the appropriate members of the Mount Hamilton
(San Jose) Council of the California Teachers* Association.
It is assumed that these individuals will have reservations
concerning voucher programs. Using the method just outlined,
we will attempt to discover what these objections are and the
basis on which they were developed.
The views of two important groups, namely school board
members and parents, will not be dealt with in these pages and
this absence should be explained. The district administration,
both school board and superintendent, have made a decided effort
to disassociate themselves from the project. Control was given
to the Sequoia Foundation so that failure, if it occured, could
not be laid at the district administration * s door. Since they
were not involved in the project, these individuals were not
contacted. On the other hand, some parents were interviewed,
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but their orai responses proved uninteresting. The Rand Corp-
oration used written instruments to interview parents. Since
this work was already underway, and since the author lacked the
resources for conducting a similar survey, reports on parents
were left out of the report. The Rand Corporation's findings
uill be presented in Chapter IV/.
The following is a brief rationale for the method of
conducting interviews used in this study. If the project actually
resembles the CSPP Proposal, we can expect that some of the
theoretical issues discussed in Chapter II to have become prac-
tical issues. If the project is quite different, the issues
will be, too. By examining the changes in issues, some notion
of the status of vouchers in Alum Rock can be determined
.
Objective 3a. Determine whether families have demon-
strated a capacity for making educational choices on a rational
basis
.
Procedure: Ue will determine how many parents are send-
ing their children to schools other than their neighborhood
school. In addition, we will determine how many families with
more than one child are sending their children to more than
one school. Both these factors are indicative of the existence
of decision making but are hardly conclusive. The opinions of
those who advise parents and the opinions of teachers and prin-
cipals will be sought to amplify the factual information.
Objective 3b. Determine whether the existence of com-
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petition has created greater diversity in participating
schools
•
Procedure: A numerical comparison of the numbers and
types of programs existing before and after introduction of
vouchers will be made.
Objective 3c. Determine how, if at all, the roles of
principals and teachers have changed as a result of partici-
pation in the program.
Procedure: Principals and teachers will be interviewed.
Teachers will be questioned concerning changes they perceive
in their oun jobs. Three areas will be focused upon. First,
relations with fellow teachers will be examined. Teachers
uill be asked to comment upon effects of competition on this
aspect of their professional life. Second, teachers will be
asked to comment on the effect, if any, vouchers have had
upon their conduct of their classroom. Ue uill want to find
out if they feel freer to create, or less free; if their
instructional acumen has been increased or decreased; and
if they prefer or do not prefer being part of a competitive
system. Finally, teachers uill be asked to comment upon
their role in school affairs. Ue will want to know if they
are taking a greater role in management of school business.
Principals will be questioned about the same aspects
of teachers* roles in order to determine if there is any dis-
parity of views between the views of the two groups. Prin-
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cipals will be asked about changes in their oun role as well.
Ue will want to know hou their style of management has changed,
if at all. Ue will uant to know whether their functions hav/e
changed. For example, do they spend more or less time acting
as disciplinarians? Do they spend more or less time on in-
service supervision? Must they attend more administrative
meetings with their staff or are there fewer? Have vouchers
resulted in a great deal more paperwork? Finally, principals
will be asked their view of the voucher project.
Interviews will all be taperecorded and transcribed
to typescript. Transcription will occur on the same day as
recording in order to allow re—use of a limited supply of tapes.
In discussion of Objectives 1 and 2 in the next chapter, edited
portions of interviews will be presented to illustrate points
to be made. A commentary, tying discussion concerning issues
examined, will be inserted into the transcript of the conver-
sations at appropriate points in discussion of Objective 2.
Interviews with principals and teachers will be sum-
marized but not reproduced. The same is true of interviews
with any other school personnel.
Chapter IV will discuss the field study in terms of
the objectives laid down in this chapter. Chapter V will make
comments of a more general nature.
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CHAPTER IV
THE FIELD STUDY
The field study was conducted in August and September
of 1973 in the Alum Rock Union School District, San Dose, Cal-
ifornia, At that time the experimental voucher project had
completed its first year of operation and uas preparing for
its second. Dr, Doel Levin is the director of the project and
is the source for the following background information.
The Alum Rock district is in a lou-income area a feu
miles south and east of the central area of San Dose, There
are some 30,000 residents in the district of uhom 18,000 are
school-aged children. The average family in Alum Rock has
six children.
The population of the district is 50% Mexican-American,
40% white, and 10% black, Uhile these figures would be un-
usual for most parts of the country, they are not in San Dose,
which is the second largest Mexican-American community in the
United States,
There are twenty-four schools in the district. During
the first year of operation, 1972-3, six schools participated
in the project. Seven schools were added in the 1973-4 school
year for a total of thirteen. As a result, slightly more
than half the students in the district participated in the
project during the year following the field study.
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The operation of the voucher program is fairly simple
and straightforward. In March of each year, parents are sent
information concerning the available programs, instructions on
hou to use the sign-up forms provided, and a description of
vouchers and their purpose. The materials sent are all bilingual.
The material emphasizes to parents that they may choose
any school listed and points out to parents the fact that their
control over their childrens* education is increased by this
procedure
.
Parents then proceed to review the material describing
the various programs offered. There uere 42 such programs in
1973—4. Since the number of programs is large enough to cause
confusion even to the most sophisticated reader, the programs
are conveniently grouped into nine categories: Traditional,
Innovative, Gifted, Fine Arts, Learning by Doing, Individualized
Learning, Multi-Cultural, Kindergarten, Bilingual.
A parent who wished to do no more could simply select
a category and find the nearest school offering such a program.
In order to help parents become more selective than that, coun-
selors uho are themselves parents may assist parents in making
choices
.
Once a choice has been made, a parent then fills out a
card indicating first, second, and third choices. Once squatters
are assigned their places — squatters are students uho attended
a given school during the last year, or the younger sibling of
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such a student — requests are filled. If there are not enough
vacancies, schools may elect to expand their capacity. Failing
that a lottery is held and the losers move to their second choice.
Schools decide to enter the program through a vote of
their faculties. Once a school has decided to enter the pro-
gram, it is free to form itself into semi-autonomous mini-schools.
The programs developed by the mini-schools are reported to the
Educational Voucher Advisor Council (El/AC) which performs some
of the functions of the El/A described in Chapter II. The EVAC
then presents the information to parents. Its other functions
will be described shortly.
Uhen a student is sent to a participating school, he
brings with him a voucher whose value is added to the school's
operating budget. In grades Kindergarten through six vouchers
were valued at $840 in 1972—3. The value for grades seven and
eight was $1,046.90. If a student qualifies for free lunch, he
also qualifies for a compensatory voucher, and brings with him
an additional $275.
It should be noted here that these vouchers represent a
significant departure from both the Friedman and the CSPP Pro-
posals. In both plans, the value of a voucher was to be det-
ermined by distributing to each family a certain share of the
amount needed to educate the community. The fund which is div-
ided to produce vouchers in Alum Rock comes from a grant of the
federal government.
Uhen a school decides to enter the voucher experiment,
81
it is electing to receive additional funds from the federal
government in the form of education vouchers. This fact re-
presents a crucial difference between voucher models and the
realities of voucher operation. A discussion of the distor-
tions produced by this means of financing is found in the
next chapter.
This difference is not the only one between the CSPP
specifications and actual voucher operations. The first
objective of the field study is a determination of these
differences. During the discussion, objectives will be re-
peated for convenience.
Objective 1. A comparison of operational and admin-
istrative procedures employed by the pilot project with pro-
ject specifications presented by CSPP to the 0E0 at the be-
ginning of the project’s planning stage.
The twelve specifications are repeated and are followed
by appropriate comments. Joel Levin is again the source for
this information.
1. The pilot project should remain in operation for
five to eight years before expanding the program.
The project has expanded its operation within the
host district and plans to continue its expansion to include
all schools in the district. Dr. Levin justifies this ex-
pansion on two grounds. First, the intention of this spec-
ification was the prevention of exportation of the project to
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other districts before it has been completely evaluated. The
current expansion is taking place entirely within the initial
district. Second, this expansion is consistent with specific-
ation 7 which requires all children in the district to be
eligible for participation in the project.
2. Before beginning the project there should be a
year long planning period.
The required planning was performed. Details of oper-
ation and the responsibilities of the EVAC were planned. The
program was explained to school faculties who then determined
whether or not they wished to participate. Schools which de-
cided to participate planned their mini-school operations and
planned their budgets around the increased incomes provided
by vouchers.
3. The population of the area should be heterogeneous.
There are three racial and ethnic groups heavily rep-
resented in Alum Rock. The figures on page 65 do not include
small numbers of Orientals and Phillippinos . The district
appears to meet the CSPP standards of racial and ethnic hetero-
geneity.
From the standpoint of economic heterogeneity, the
district is less qualified. The area is uniformly low-income.
Literally no middle class housing exists in the area. On the
other hand, it is far from being a ghetto. Practically the
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entire working population consists of unskilled laborers.
Or. Levin's records indicate that none of the teachers in
the district resides there.
In an economically heterogeneous community it would
be possible to discover if the use of education vouchers has
any affect upon educational equality. The Alum Rock project
uill not lead to such discoveries. The fact that vouchers are
being used in a low-income area has had a great deal to do
with the attitudes of participants towards the project. This
matter uill be discussed in detail in following sections.
4. The area in each project should include only one
municipality.
Of course, the project includes less than one municipal-
ity* However, it is not unusual in California for a community
to have more than one school district. This is particularly
true in areas near secondary urban centers. For educational
purposes, Alum Rock is a community. The project in fact
includes only one such community.
5. There should be local private schools willing to
participate in the program.
There is at least one private school willing to par-
ticipate in the program. It has not been permitted to do so.
The local chapter of the California Teachers* Association has
indicated that it uill withdraw its support from the program
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if any non-public schools are given voucher funds. Dr. Levin
is convinced that the project cannot survive without support
of the local union. As a result, there are no private schools
participating in the program and no prospects that any will
be permitted to do so.
Of course, this is a strong divergence from the ori-
ginal design of the CSPP Proposal. Every voucher proposal
made to date has assumed that public schools will be in com-
petition with private ones. Failure of this specification
is the most crucial difference between the CSPP Proposal and
the actual voucher project.
6. The program should extend through grade six, but
not above.
The project does not meet this specification. One
middle school is participating. Plans exist for including
a senior high school in coming years.
7. All children of appropriate age should be eligible
to participate in theprogram.
At the beginning of the 1973-4 school year, slightly
more than half the children in Alum Rock were eligible to
participate in the program. A child becomes elgible when
his neighborhood school votes in favor of participation. If
it does, the child may then be sent to any voucher school his
parents choose. If his neighborhood school does not choose
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to participate in the program, than the child muet continue
to attend that school. As a result, the project does not
meet this specification.
8. Schools must be permitted to fill a limited number
of places any uay they like, but must not discriminate in
doing so.
9. Schools are required to fill one-half their places
by lottery.
These specifications will be considered jointly since
they are closely related. The placement procedure in Alum
Rock is as follows.
In flay, parents make applications to the EVAC. The
application indicates which school they wish their children
to attend, which mini-school within the school, and the number
of the mini-school. Three choices can be made and the order
of preference indicated.
A family is said to have squatter*s rights at the
school it attended before joining the voucher project. Any
child who attends that school is a squatter and so are all
his younger siblings. If a squatter chooses to attend the
school he is currently attending, he must be allowed to do so.
Applications are received at the EVAC*s offices and
results are tabulated. If no school is overenrolled, then
everyone may attend his first choice school. An announcement
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is made concerning the number of vacancies in each program
to facilitate last minute changes.
If some schools are overenrolled, the following pro-
cedure goes into effect. All squatters are placed in their
current schools if they wish to be placed there, (if a
squatter does not exercise his right, he cannot reclaim it
later.) The number of vacancies to be filled by non-squatters
is determined. Non-squatters are chosen randomly by grade
and program until all vacancies in a given building are filled.
Remaining applicants are placed in their second choice
program if their first choice is closed. If the second choice
is also overenrolled
,
another lottery is held and losers are
placed in their third choice.
If a school is overenrolled, the foregoing procedure
can sometimes be eliminated if the faculty so choose. They
may elect to increase the number of students they will allow
in the school. They may go farther and choose to accept
everyone who applies to them.
If a school chooses this option, it is supplied with
additional space. It may receive portable classrooms or space
in the building of another school which is underenrolled.
In this way, the Alum Rock district has avoided racial
and ethnic segregation. This is largely due to the fact that
the schools were well integrated before the voucher project
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began. Even if all squatters were to exercise their rights,
the schools would be integrated.
While the procedures used have had no adverse effects
in Alum Rock, they may set a dangerous precedent. In a comm-
unity in which whites and blacks are geographically segregated,
the granting of squatters* rights could result in maintaining
a racially segregated school system. Suppose that a large num-
ber of black parents decide that schools in white neighborhoods
are superior to their own. They elect to send their children
to them but find that all places are filled by squatters. The
faculty, perhaps influenced by parents, chooses not to expand
its facilities to include any more applicants.
This set of events is not at all unlikely. The CSPP
Proposal contained provisions which would have prevented any
such occurences. Since the proposal grants no special rights
to children attending neighborhood schools, all applicants are
placed on an equal footing. Since schools are prohibited from
practicing discrimination, the hypothetical set of events pre-
sented could not occur. The Alum Rock procedures represent
another divergence from the CSPP plan.
10. There should be no arbitrary expulsions.
Expulsions are dealt with uniformly through a district
code •
11 # There should be an E V/A to oversee the program.
ee
The Alum Rock EVAC is not autonomous in the way the
CSPP intended its EVA to be. Its capacity is strictly advis-
ory. Control of the program remains with the district super-
intendant
.
The EVAC has no authority over participating schools.
The EVA could refuse to cash vouchers of schools failing to
observe all rules of the program. The EVAC has no such power.
The regulatory functions which the EVA was designed to per-
form remain in the hands of the public schools.
12. The EVA should collect and distribute information
about schools as necessary.
Along with its co-ordination of student placements,
this is one of the EVAC*s two major tasks. It publishes
a pamphlet, printed in both Spanish and English, explaining
to parents how the voucher program operates. Another biling-
ual pamphlet contains descriptions of programs of the various
mini-schools.
EVAC is responsible for hiring paraprof essionals whose
function is to advise parents on their educational options.
These counselors are themselves parents in the district. They
are prohibited from making recommendations but may amplify
the printed descriptions of schools in order to aid parents
in their decisions. (Some counselors admit to making recom-
mendations to friends or to parents who ask for one.)
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The objective of the foregoing analysis is a compar-
ison of the operations of the project with the specifications
of the CSPP, The project meets specifications 1, 2, 4, 10,
and 12. There is no plan to expand the project beyond Alum
Rock in the foreseeable future. There uas a year long planning
period. The area includes only one municipality. There are
no arbitrary expulsions. The El/AC collects and distributes
pertinent information to parents.
The project meets specification 3 in one respect and
fails to in another. The area is racially and ethnically
heterogeneous. However, it is economically thoroughly homo-
genous
.
The project fails to meet specifications 5, 6, 7, 8,
9, and 11. No private schools are permitted to take part in
the program. The program extends beyond grade six. All
children of appropriate age are not eligible to participate.
The CSPP guidelines on admission policies are not met. The
EVAC has a much weaker role than was projected for the EVA.
A discussion of the significance of this comparison
will be deferred to the next chapter. For now, we note that
the specifications which the project fails to meet seem on
the most part to be more important than those it meets.
Questions of which schools and which students may participate
and the process by which they select each other seem vital to
the CSPP voucher plan. They are precisely the questions on
90
uhich the differences between theory and practice are most
outstanding
.
The second objective of the field study uas an examin-
ation of the attitudes of certain project participants. The
technique used uas one involving questions of theoretical im-
port. Responses uere recorded and transcribed.
Four intervieus uere conducted. The first two involved
members of the projects administrative staff. These uere
Dr. Levin, Project Director, and Mr. Sanchez, Co-ordinator of
parent information services. The second tuo intervieus involved
representatives of the local council of the CTA. The first
of these intervieus uas uith Mr. Dames Essaman, Executive
Director of the Mount Hamilton Council of the CTA. The second
uas a joint intervieu uith Mr. Luke Levers, President of the
Alum Rock Educators* Association and uith Mr. Leroy Uiens,
Chairman of the Certified Employees* Council. The Alum Rock
Educators* Association is one of six such associations making
up the Mount Hamilton Council. The Certified Employees* Coun-
cil is the negotiating arm of the Alum Rock Educators* Associa-
tion and also acts on behalf of the local American Education
Research Council, the American Federation of Teachers, the
Alum Rock Administrators* Association, and the Association of
Special Services Employees.
The format for the presentation of edited transcripts
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is as follows. Questions will be printed as they were asked.
The interviewee *s response will follow preceded by his initial
and a colon. In the course of the presentation, it will be
appropriate to insert comments designed to key the examination
to issues of theoretical import. Such comments will be set
off from the main body of the transcripts by asterisks.
Interv iew with Dr. Levin
. Has the project lived up to
your expectations?
L: Yes.
Uhat makes you say so?
L: There's a whole array of facts to indicate the pro-
ject is working. The creation of significant alternative
forms of education is a fact. The use of options by parents
is a fact. Those were the purposes of the program and this
is what is actually happening.
Isn*t there more to it than that? Isn't part of the
idea to test the performance of public schools against par-
ochial and private alternatives?
L: I don't know how important a part that plays, really.
I'm of the opinion that using parochial schools would be un-
constitutional.
I think that's an open question. Uhat about private
schools? I understand that some teachers wanted to open a
free school here but it was opposed.
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L: It's possible that in a feu years uhen people are
less threatened than they are now, ue can do this, Ue are
still negotiating about it.
Some of your critics in the district say that this is
just an attempt to keep the word ’’voucher" alive, that this
isn’t really a voucher program. Uhat do you say to that?
L: Uhen I hear that, I feel good. It means that ue
aren’t threatening them, that they are going to let us get on
uith the project.
But wouldn’t a real voucher be a threat? Certainly
Shanker thinks so. The state CTA thinks so too.
L: Uhat’s a real voucher? Ue’ve given schools the
opportunity to innovate as they want and parents a choice.
That’s the real purpose of the program and that's uhat ue've
done.
**-*
This last statement represents a major shift in position
from original writings on the subject. A number of writers
discussed in Chapter II, notably 3encks (1966), Clark (1969),
and Levin (1968), argued that vouchers were a form of demono-
polizing education. The intention of such a system would be
to force public schools to create options and to compete uith
fresh ideas from non-public sources. Jencks (1966) indicates
that in a true voucher system, the notion of public and non-
public schools as different kinds of educational entities
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breaks down altogether.
During the initial planning stage of the project, the
Mount Hamilton CTA quickly indicated that there was no poss-
ibility of support from teachers unless competition were lim-
ited to the public schools. The projects proponents shifted
their thinking auay from the idea of competition among all
interested schools and settled for competition among public
schools alone.
The CTA rightfully labels a voucher program uhich in-
cludes competition from non—public schools a •'real" voucher
program since that is the only kind of program uhich they had
any reason to believe uas being planned. No uriter on the
subject has discussed a voucher model uhich does not include
non-public schools.
Once it uas agreed that vouchers could not be used to
threaten the position of the public schools, uhat uas left
of the program served to benefit teachers. Such benefits in-
clude greater managerial responsibility, greater freedom in
choosing and designing programs, and increased funds for pur-
chasing equipment and training.
•***
If uhat has been achieved is just that — more programs
and greater parent participation — couldn*t that have been
achieved uithout using vouchers?
L: Maybe it could have, but it uasn*t. This district
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has been receiving Title I funds for a long time and they come
to much more than the money allocated to the voucher program.
But the much smaller voucher investment has produced much more
change. There are more programs, more teachers involved in
management, more parent participation and all this is the
result of vouchers*
***
Several more questions were asked on thi3 topic* The
ansuers did not progress beyond the one given* It does not
seem satisfactory.
Everyone in the district seems to agree that parents
are more involved in the schools than they were* The prolifer-
ation of program alternatives is a fact. However, Alum Rock
has a history of strong parent involvement. Its teachers have
been yearning to innovate for years, according to their oun
reports. Lack of money has been one of the chief stumbling
blocks.
The voucher program did bring funds into the district.
It is clear that those funds have made a difference. Uhat
is not clear is the necessity of labelling those funds "educ-
ation vouchers" in order to achieve the result obtained.
***
I want to ask you some questions about the differences
between your program and the CSPP Proposal. Why did you add
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squatters* rights,
L: Basically, ue did that because ue had too. Parents
were upset thinking that they might not be able to go to their
neighborhood schools.
To the extent that you are a model for future voucher
programs, isn*t this a dangerous precedent? In an already
segregated district, couldn’t this serve to keep segregation
in existence?
L: Ue’ve found that even uhen people have squatters*
rights they don’t always use them. But other districts will
have to make these arrangements based on local conditions.
Another precedent that seems dangerous to me is tying
the EV/AC to the Superintendent, Once you bring in non-public
schools, if that happens, uon’t the E\/AC have to become in-
dependant?
L: Not necessarily. The CTA position is that those
schools must meet the same standards as the public schools,
Will that affect the willingness of private schools to
enter the program?
Ls That’s something ue don’t know at this point. It's
too early to tell what will happen,
***
The interview with Dr, Levin was considerably longer
than the section presented here, A major portion of the results
of the interview have been presented in the discussion of
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our first objective (pp. ei“9o) and in the presentation of
background material ( pp. 78-81). Additional references to
the interview will be made in discussing objectives 3a and
3b. As with all other interviews presented and discussed in
this chapter, a general discussion will be deferred until
Chapter V.
Interview wit h Hr. Sanchez
. Transcripts of this inter-
view will not be presented since its relevance to the issues
with which the field study was concerned is limited. However,
Mr. Sanchez* views will be summarized briefly since they offer
additional insights into the nature of the focus of the Alum
Rock project.
Mr* Sanchez* job is the collection of information con-
cerning schools and programs and its distribution to parents.
The project employs a number of parents as advisors to other
parents in the district. They serve to interpret printed in-
formation and to aid parents in their educational choices.
Mr. Sanchez is the supervisor of these counselors.
He views the goals of the voucher project as a means
of radicalizing parents in the district. The effects of
voucher participation upon educational quality are secondary
in his view to the effects upon parents.
His attitude may be legitimate. It is certainly at
cross-purposes to the goals of the CSPP Proposal. In that
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proposal, the primary goal is thp inwinnr a f fy yucu. x rne mvigoration of public educ-
atxon through the use of competition. A result of the ful-
fillment of that goal may be greater parental pouer over
education. Other expected by-products include greater equal-
ity of educational opportunity, greater racial and ethnic
integration, and an increased acceptance of educational axper-
imentation
•
To choose any of these secondary goals as the primary
focus of the project is bound to produce distortions in the
program. Such distortions have in fact occured.
The schools have not been satisfied uith the perform-
ance of the parent counselors. They have demanded a change
in the orientation of the counselors* role. Beginning uith
the 1973-4 school year, counselors uere assigned to individual
schools rather than to Mr. Sanchez* office. Principals expect
counselors in the future to act in some uays as agents of
the schools to which they are assigned. They uill present
information concerning a particular program uithin the school
to parents who request it, but may not present information
about programs in any other school.
Reaction to Mr. Sanchez* approach to parent information
services has resulted in a limitation of the functions of the
EVAC. It appears that information uill not flou quite as
freely as it once did. This is an unfortunate result which
ought to be noted in plans for future voucher programs.
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I n teruieu with Hr. Esaaman
. I'm assuming that because
you represent the CTA you're against vouchers. Is that a
reasonable assumption?
E: That depends on uhat you mean by vouchers. Uhat
ue have here isn't a voucher at all.
Uhat do you mean by a voucher?
E: This program has only public schools. Uhen the
legislature first considered the bill, they were talking about
allowing any certified school to participate. This is just
a way of pumping money into low income areas. It's also kept
the word "voucher" alive for another try.
How would you feel about a real voucher program?
E: Ue'll fight it.
That seems paradoxical. You don*t like this program
because it doesn't allow private schools, but if it did you
still wouldn't like it. Maybe you wouldn't like it even more.
E: Uhat I'm saying is don't even call this a voucher
since it isn't. Ue defeated vouchers in the legislature, so
they changed the idea to make it acceptable and called it by
the same name.
In your opinion, how much does this program resemble
the original idea?
E: The only thing left is that parents can send their
kids to any school they want. The whole thing is so unimport-
ant that the state CTA council hasn't taken a position on it.
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They don't care about it at all?
E: They have dropped it from the list of situations
they watch.
But if a private school tried to apply for voucher
funds?
E: They would be against it and so would we. Thera
would be wild opposition.
How do you feel the program is working?
E: Parents don't know what to do. A lot of them take
a shotgun approach and send each kid to a different school and
see what happens. A lot of people are leaving their neighbor-
hood schools this year but I don't think they knew what they
were doing. Someone who doesn't know what he's doing is not
going to be able to pick a successful teacher.
One of the arguments for vouchers is that parents are
in a good position to choose for their kids because they know
them best.
E: I'm not sure they do know best. Parents know
what clothes their kids like, but they can't make medical de-
cisions for their kids.
They choose the doctor.
E: But we're talking about choosing a program, not an
individual.
***
This argument from parental incompetence has already
100
been discussed (see pp. 49-5^. Mr. Essaman's point uould be
a good one if his analogy were valid. Ue do not allow parents
to prescribe medication and treatment for their children
(beyond a certain point) because there exists a body of ex-
pert opinion concerning medical matters. Since medical pract-
itioners d£ know better than parents how to treat illness,
their opinion is given great weight.
There is no analogous body of expert opinion in educ-
ation. No clearer case could be made for this statement than
to point to the way in which children actually are placed in
schools. Children are placed in their neighborhood school
because it i3 their neighborhood school. That is the reason.
Alternatively, they are placed in a non-neighborhood school
in order to achieve a desired racial balance.
Presumably, if a more expert means of placing children
in school were in our possession, ue uould use it. The fact
that ue do things the uay ue do is the strongest reason for
supposing that ue lack the means to do it any better.
Therefore, the analogy betueen education and medicine
is faulty. M If parents are incompetent, they must not be
alloued to make educational choices” is not a proven statement.
And, of course, parents may sometimes be competent to make the
requisite decisions.
***
Hou are teachers being affected by the program?
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E: Some teachers resent having to compete. They’re a
minority. A number of teachers have advertised.
I’ve heard about a matchbook cover ad for a program.
Did that really happen?
E: No comment.
Uhich school ua3 it?
E: No comment.
***
A feu teachers mentioned that such advertising had
been used but would not say uhere or when. No one else in the
district uas willing to talk about it.
***
How else are teachers being affected?
E: Teachers who like the program like it for the money.
Vouchers have moved a lot of federal money into Alum Rock.
They also get a lot more freedom, more responsibility in man-
aging school affairs — things we’ve been pushing for for years.
How would you change the program?
E; Ue need to make changes in the district contract
to protect teachers who may get left out by vouchers. If
there is no spot for a teacher who wants out of a voucher
school, we want that teacher to be paid anyway. That needs
to be cleared up in our next contract meeting.
***
fir. Essaman uas the strongest local critic of the pro-
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gram encountered in the course of the field study. The inter-
view with him was unsatisfying since it did not reveal to any
appreciable extent the uay in which theoretical issues are
being dealt with in the pragmatic realm. No doubt this is
partly due to the fact that Mr. Essaman does not agree that
a voucher program is in operation in Alum Rock.
His view is that the project is keeping the issue alive
while pouring large quantities of money into classrooms. His
concern is that the money pours in without adversely affecting
the rights of teachers.
final statement indicates that vouchers may become
even less threatening to educational monopolists than they
were at the time of the study. If teachers can choose not to
compete without penalty of any kind, it is clear that many
of the weakest ones will elect to remain out of the program
entirely. Since one of the supposed benefits of competition
is the fact that it weeds out the poorest choices, such action
would be a blow to efforts to implement the CSPP Proposal more
fully.
In the following interview with Mr. Levers and Mr.
Uiens, the conversation tended to touch on issues of more
basic concern. Uhile their stand is much less extreme than
Mr. Essaman*s, it is nevertheless quite firm on a number of
crucial points.
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I.nteruieu uith Plr. Levers a n d llr. Diana . Uhy have
the Alum Rock teachers agreed to participate in a voucher
program?
U: The teachers in Alum Rock agreed to give their bless-
ing on a voluntary basis to the program. Then the CTA gave
its blessing by not opposing the program. By the uay, the
NEA and the AFT are still opposed.
Uhy?
U: Uhat they oppose is the use of federal funds in sup-
port of private schools. They were ready to drop their oppos-
ition and take a neutral stand until the Neu Hampshire idea
came up. Then they went back. Now they're fighting anything
uith the word "voucher " in it.
***
The reference to Neu Hampshire concerns attempts by
the National Institute on Education to implement in Neu Hamp-
shire a voucher program in uhich private schools uould be per-
mitted to participate. The program is generally thought of
as an outgrouth of the Friedman Proposal, but is actually much
closer in spirit to the Egalitarian Model (see p. 13). The
program uill be discussed briefly in Chapter V.
***
Uhat are your oun feelings about vouchers?
L: Vouchers have really changed things for the better
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in Alum Rock. Parents are more involved, teachers can be
more creative in their planning and teaching, and they can
take more control of school management. Still, this is only
a first step. Ue've only begun to be involved with vouchers.
Ue just don't knou what will happen in four or five years if
the program continues. There are neu developments uhich ue
can't imagine. And you can't predict uhat will happen when
you transfer these ideas to another district.
One thing that appeals to me about vouchers is that
they make job security for teachers contingent upon performance.
Lihy should anyone, including the NEA and the AFT, oppose such
a sensible idea?
L: Those provisions are totally unnecessary. The in-
competent teachers are already dealt with in state lau. There
are uell defined procedures for removing an incompetent teach-
er. Ue're not against removing incompetent individuals from
classrooms. Ue'd like to see these people removed. But it
isn't our job to do it. It's up to the principals, and they
haven't been using their pouer in this area.
U: This is a good point. Administrators don't make
use of their options in this area, Most of them lack the cou-
rage to charge a teacher with incompetence and then carry
through uith hearings. There is no reason for there being an
incompetent teacher in any classroom in this state. You don't
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need vouchers to solve this problem.
***
Of course, the point can be made that vouchers are
needed to solve this problem since the available remedies are
not being used.
***
U (cont.): This brings up something else that bothers
me about vouchers. There is no provision being made for teach-
ers who don*t uant to participate in the program. Last year
there uere only six schools participating. This year there
uill be thirteen. Next year I imagine there will be more.
The people who don*t uant to be in the program are going to
be gradually squeezed out, and ue are going to have to do
something to help those people.
Uhy should anyone be exempted from the rigors of the
marketplace? To refuse to compete sounds almost like an ad-
mission of incompetence.
L: That isn*t so because ue are moving into a period
of fairly strong standards for tenure and performance. Under
the Stahl Bill ( a stateuide evaluative system) there are
specific rules on uhen tenure is terminated. The school board
along uith the CTA draus up a list of particulars. An evalu-
ator decides if the teacher has met the standards for the
grade level. If the evaluator does his job, there's no pro-
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blem. Either the teacher did a job or didn’t. But with
vouchers you take auay the evaluator and leave the decision
in the hands of the mini-schools. That is no legal policy,
***
The transcript of this section of the interview could
be extended for many pages. The discussion soon bogged doun
into a repetition of the interviewees* claim.
It is not at all clear that the appeal to pre-existing
legal standards argues against the advantages of free market
competition. The two can be made to complement each other.
Consideration of the analogous case of the grading of apples,
an example well worked by some Oxford philosophers, may help
to clarify the issue.
The government sets certain standards in the grading
of apples. Apples may be graded from Grade A Fancy doun to
Utility, Definite standards to be used in grading are pub-
lished by the Department of Agriculture and it is possible for
an individual to become a competent grader of apples in a rel-
atively short period of time.
Once an objective judgement has been made concerning
an apple’s grade, it is still possible for an efficient mar-
ket to make finer distinctions among the members of any one
grade. As a result, some apples will be more apt to be chosen
than others, and some will not be chosen at all.
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Government standards uill prevent a rotten apple or
one which is badly spotted or too small from becoming a Grade
A apple. Such standards uill not insure that all apples of
a given grade are equal in every respect. There are still
decisions for the consumer of apples to make.
Similarly, state standards, properly applied, which
they are not, uill eliminate incompetence from the educational
marketplace. But competence does not entail excellence. There
is still room for decision on the part of the consumer of
education
•
Pre-existing legal standards help to make decisions
easier for consumers of apples and of education in two ways.
They make a rough categorization prior to the consumer's se-
lection and they eliminate choices which ought not to be acc-
epted anyway. A reliance on an efficient legal standard in-
sures only that bad apples and bad teachers have disappeared
from the marketplace. Such reliance does not guarantee that
each consumer receives the best apple or teacher he can.
Given a group of teachers, all of them competent, some
uill tend to be chosen by parents before others for some reason
which those doing the choosing think important. It may happen
that some teachers uill not be chosen even though they are
certif iably competent. In this way the marketplace tends to
make precisely those distinctions which the consumers of educ-
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ation wish to make at any particular time.
***
Uhat is the effect of competition on teachers?
L: I don't think there have been any strong effects.
If you really uant the answer to that, come back and see us
in three years. Uhen there are hardly any non-voucher schools
left, ue'll know more.
But haven't some schools lost enrollment? How do
teachers react to that?
L: This has happenned uhen there has been an exit of
teachers and administrators from those schools.
U: Ue have tuo concerns in this area. One is that ue
have locked parents into voucher schools not favorable to
vouchers. If you look around, you'll see that there are a
small number of voucher schools which have had a difficult
adjustment. On the other hand, ue have locked parents out
of voucher schools uhen they wanted to get into them. The
same thing applies to teachers. A lot of them uant either
in or out of vouchers and it will take time before it all gets
settled
•
Do teachers uant into voucher schools because of the
increased funding?
L: Uhen ue took a vote on extending the program in
one school, ue announced that there uas an additional $179,000
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in funding available. Only $50,000 of this uas from vouchers.
They could have had a nice funding even uithout vouchers, so
I don*t think it*s just the money. The money helps them do
a better job. Teachers uant to develop programs and improve
uhat they*re doing.
U: Another point. CTA has been in favor of developing
the autonomy of local schools. Before vouchers, ue had the
pouer to create this kind of change but no money to do it uith.
That explains uhy teachers are auare of funds. Teachers used
to pay out of their oun pockets for materials.
Is the administration of the program creating neu
levels of bureaucracy to deal uith?
L: Principals object to any neu authority. But Doel*s
(Dr. Levin*s) position is necessary. This year uas the first
that the legislature voted the school budget uithin fifteen
days of the opening of school, but schools have to have their
budgets in by Duly 1 . In that kind of situation you need to
have someone uho is responsible.
U: I uanted to get back to this business of job sec-
urity. Ue didn*t mention before that a group of teachers from
this district are getting together to develop a neu program
outside of any existing schools. The GEO is very hesitant
about this, but the CTA is all for it.
I thought you said you uere against that sort of thing.
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U: These teachers are from the district so they're not
putting anybody out of a job. And this uill be a neu school.
A traditional private school has so many advantages over a
public school in terms of funding from private sources, more
money for better materials, buildings, and so on, that there
really couldn't be fair competition. But give teachers an
equal footing and the public schools uill uin out every time.
Let them both follou the state codes on curriculum and dis-
cipline, give them the same rules and rights, the same student
policies, and the public schools uill uin.
So you uould uant to exclude a Summerhill school or a
Montessori school or anything of that type.
U: A Summerhill school couldn't operate uithin our
school board's policies. You*d have to make a special case
for them. That's just uhat ue uant to avoid. Let them com-
pete on an equal footing and uithout any unfair advantage,
and it uill be all right.
As long as they aren’t putting CTA teachers out of
uork.
U? Right.
But that isn't really competition. You uant to give
the public schools everything and leave to the private schools
the leftovers.
U: No. Look, a company in business has a neu product.
Ill
They don't fire ev/erybody making older products. They expand
uith the neu one. By maintaining the present structure ue
have an excess of teachers. By expanding our operation ue
could create a need uhich couldn't be filled even by the un-
employed teachers. For example, ue have a teacher of deaf
children in this district. Ue uere able to provide more
funding for her and nou she has a program for siblings of deaf
children# Uith more money you could expand any program. You
could extend educational programs to parents. There are so
many possibilities that there is no problem in finding avenues
for teaching talent. Uith private school vouchers, if they
are competing equally, you are essentially just reinventing
the wheel# There is so much uork to be done uith public
funds for public schools that there is no reason to spread
the money to private schools.
*-•**
This is a restatement of the first argument used to
justify the existence of monopolies, the argument from tech-
nological inefficiency (see p. 48-49)# Competition to public
education is characterized as wasteful replication. Of course,
if private schools are forced to model themselves after public
ones in every important detail, as Uiens insists, then they
will be reinventing the wheel#
If parents choose educational programs, there seems
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to be no reason uhy they could not choose among various
curricular orientations and various disciplinary styles.
Tying the argument from technological inefficiency to a spec-
ific set of standards — in this case the set used by the
public schools — leads instead to the second argument, which
states that parents are incompetent to make decisions. Pre-
vious comments on that argument can be applied to choices
concerning curriculum and discipline (see pp, 49-52, 99-100).
***
Do you have any final comments to make?
L: Dust this. For a program like this to uork, the
district has to be in a position to take risks. Alum Rock
was in a position to take risks. Ue risked running into
trouble uith the PTA, the CTA, the Mount Hamilton Council
and a couple of other groups. Ue had to balance the risks
of trouble uith these groups against the money ue uould get
from the government. The district had to have that money.
Taxes are very light; incomes are lou. Teachers uere defeated
by money. They uere spending money out of their own pockets.
So ue chanced it. For a uealthy district, there uould be
very feu risks indeed. But as far as ue can tell, our risk
taking paid off.
The foregoing transcripts uere intended to present as
accurately as possible the attitudes of project participants
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towards education vouchers. Those attitudes may be summarized
briefly as follows. The teachers* representatives are willing
to support the program only when it serves the interests of
teachers. Absolutely no compromises on this point have been
made, and it seems clear that none are forthcoming. V/ouchers
appear to have brought teachers more money for materials, more
freedom in program construction, and more managerial respon-
sibility. (These points will be explored further in discussion
of the remaining objectives.) The teachers* representatives
have permitted the program to operate to the extent that it
has provided them with these benefits.
The project staff, for its part, perceives that educ-
ation in the district is better than it was before the beginn-
ing of the project. They justifiably reason that these bene-
fits are a result of education vouchers. In order to achieve
what they have, it has been necessary to sacrifice some of
the most important points of the CSPP Proposal. The resulting
program is so different from the original intentions that
it has been called a counterfeit. The attitude of the voucher
project staff is that the sacrifices are justified by the
educational results. In short, they are willing to sacrifice
the main thrust of the voucher proposal in order to achieve
some of the expected side effects.
They have little choice. The program can operate on
the terms of the Mount Hamilton CTA or not at all. Even
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though the program diverges sharply from the CSPP Proposal,
the administrator maintains the attitude that the achieve-
ments of the program are due to the use of vouchers. This
attitude will be critically examined in Chapter V.
Objective 3a of the field study is an assessment of
the demonstrated capacity of families to make educational
choices on a rational basis. The discussion of this issue
will be brief. Dr. Levin*s records indicate that in the
1972-
3 school year, only 3$ of families in voucher schools
chose to send their children outside the neighborhood school.
The figures for 1973-4 indicate that nearly 14$ were sending
their children to non-neighborhood schools. During the
1973-
4 school year 38$ of families with more than one child
uere sending their children to at least tuo schools. Dr.
Levin cites these tuo latter facts as indications of increased
parental decision-making.
His opinion and the opinion of the parent counselors
intervieued is that parents are trying to make the correct
decision for their children. Counselors noted that parents
uere asking more probing questions and more of them in 1973
than they did in 1972. They felt that many parents uere
really just beginning to get to knou their children. As that
process continues* they expect the quality of decision-making
to improve accordingly.
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It is difficult to assess the meaning of these figures.
Mr. Essaman feels that parents are choosing blindly, but
this attitude is as much a consequence of his views as an
observation on the data.
Although some parents are making decisions of some
sort, it remains that over 86$ are still sending their child-
ren to their neighborhood school. This may be because they
are satisfied with the school and it may be because they do
not know uhat else to do. The available information is in-
sufficient for a further determination.
Some 62$ of families with more than one child are
sending all their children to the same school. Given a
family of six children (the average family size in Alum Rock),
uhat is the probability that all of them are best suited to
the same type of educational program? Perhaps the answer
is 62$. If so, then parents in Alum Rock are indeed choosing
wisely. It is more likely that the true probability is much
lower, but we have no information to guide us to the answer.
For now, our information is too spotty and the Alum
Rock project is too young for the question phrased in Objective
3a to be answered.
Objective 3b of the field study is an assessment of
whether the existence of competition has created greater
diversity in the schools. Our answer to this question can
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be definite. Before the introduction of vouchers there were
only two types of classrooms in Alum Rock. The majority
were variations of traditional classrooms. The remainder were
open classrooms. Because of lack of money, many teachers uho
wanted to expand their classroom operations into new areas
were unable to do so, A creative urge was unquestionably
strong in many teachers but remained unsatisfied due to lack
of funds. When vouchers brought uith them significant federal
funding, an innovative explosion appears to have taken place.
For the 1973-4 school year, thirteen schools participated.
Uithin these schools were forty-tuo programs. They have
been classified by the EV/AC into nine basic types. The
categories are in all cases self-explanatory.
Fifteen programs are classified as Traditional/Academic
.
Six are classified as Learning by Doing. Five are considered
Innovative/Open Classroom. There are four Individualized
Learning Programs and four Fine and Creative Arts programs.
Three programs are classified Multi-Cultural and three more
are reserved for Kindergarteners. Tuo programs are Bilingual/
Bicultural and one is reserved for gifted students.
A brief analysis indicates the following. If Learning
by Doing, Innovative/Open Classroom and Individualized Learn-
ing programs are considered species of the same genus, then
it appears that there are an equal number of traditional and
•'innovative" classroom programs in operation. Of the remain-
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ing twelve programs, three are restricted to Kindergarteners
and one is restricted to gifted children. There are nine
programs left which do not fit easily into popular education-
al categories. These nine programs are all thoroughly new,
the result of creativity on the part of the teachers who
developed them.
This last group represents 21 % of the total. If we
lump this group with the "innovative" classroom programs,
we find that some 57$> of the programs are in one way or another
out of the ordinary. In comparison, the programs of non-
voucher schools lean much more heavily to the traditional
classroom.
It is clear that diversity in the schools is a fact.
Our question asks if the diversity was the result of com-
petition. It does not appear that this is the case. The
teachers in this district wanted to innovate before vouchers
were introduced. They were able to do so after vouchers were
introduced only because vouchers carried extra money into the
district. Had vouchers not brought such funds into Alum
Rock, it is not at all clear that teachers could have brought
about the changes which did occur.
If the money which enabled the teachers to change had
come in some other form, perhaps as a direct grant from the
federal government, it seems likely that innovations would
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have occurred. In short, these teachers wanted to innovate.
They did not require competition as a stimulus to motivate
them to innovate. Uhat they did require ua 3 money. Only
in the sense that vouchers provided money can they be said
to be the cause of the resulting diversity.
The final objective of the field study is an investi-
gation of how, if at all, participation in the voucher project
has affected the roles of principals and teachers. Six prin-
cipals were interviewed. These were the principals of the six
schools which had completed their first year of participation
in the project at the time of the study. Their names and
schools follow.
1. Mr. Donald Ayers, Millard McCollam School,
2. Mr. Thomas Fay, Donal Meyer School,
3. Mr. Armen Hanzad, Pala School,
4. Mr. Dames 0*Berg, Mildred Goss School,
5. Mr. Frank Uilkens, Grandin Miller School, and
l
6. Mr. Derry Uitt, Sylvia Cassell School.
Mr. Uilkens had a number of strong reservations con-
cerning the ability of vouchers to change the roles of prin-
cipals and teachers, Mr. 0*Berg felt that participation in
the program had produced radical changes at his school. The
remaining four principals held positive, but more moderate,
views
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Mr. Uilkens felt that vouchers had enormous potential.
At the time of our discussion, he felt that that potential
had not been fulfilled to any important extent.
Uhile a great many programs had developed, Mr. Uilkens
felt that these mere not substantially different from pre-
existing programs. He felt that teachers had been promised
much more autonomy than they actually received.
As the planning year progressed, Mr. Uilkens learned
that his teachers could not come to any common agreement on
goals for the school. They split into factional camps. Some
teachers uere not included in any group. Hurt feelings, un-
spoken resentments and devastated teaching performances uere
the result.
Uhen it came time for parents to begin making their
selections, a number of teachers at Miller School began openly
campaigning for vouchers. There were accusations of unfair
advertising. The practice was stopped by district officials.
Uhen the dust had cleared from these events, Miller
School learned that the families who had been attending it
had strong loyalties to the school. As a result, Miller was
oversubscribed and the efforts to secure an adequate market
had proven unnecessary.
Mr. Uilkens saw no change in his role as principal.
He remained chief disciplinarian, business manager, evaluator,
and considered himself responsible for the smooth operation
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of educational programs.
Mr. Uilkens noted that it is impossible to transfer a
teacher out of a school against the teacher*s will. As a re-
sult, teachers uho do not approve of program changes or uho
do not wish to participate in any mini—school program can dis-
turb the life of the entire school. Teachers uho cannot fit
comfortably into any program must be forced to join one pro-
gram or another. A number of difficult situations have arisen
as a result.
Four principals uere optimistic about changes uhich had
occured, though not without some reservations. These princi-
pals included Mr. Hanzad, Mr. Ayers, Mr. Uitt, and Mr. Fay.
Mr. Hanzad felt that the program’s biggest contribution
uas in the financial opportunity uhich it had given to the
community. His school had been successful in attracting mem-
bers of the community to meetings where they became involved
in planning programs and budgets. However, Mr. Hanzad pointed
out that his school has always enjoyed strong parental involve-
ment
.
His school had taken the radical step of including stu-
dents on the advisory board of each mini-school. He felt
that students had made a meaningful contribution to the school’s
operation
•
He felt that teachers had changed as a result of par-
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ticipation in the program. In his view they have become more
innovative and have a stronger commitment to finding effective
solutions to their educational problems. He emphasized that
these traits had aluays been present in the staff and that
vouchers had enabled them to become active.
His oun role underuent major changes. The assistant
principal has taken over most duties relating to business man-
agement and curriculum development. The principal himself is
less involved in disciplinary problems because there are now
feuer problems of that kind. At the same time, the program
has created a large number of visitors. Mr. Hanzad spends a
great deal of time showing visitors around the school and talk-
ing with them. Much of the rest of his time is spent selling
the Pala program to parents and explaining the program to el-
ementary teachers in the hope of creating greater curriculum
articulation. (Pala is a middle school.)
Mr. Ayers reported similar changes. Because vouchers
were involving teachers in more decisions concerning curriculum
and budget management, his oun involvement in these areas had
decreased markedly. Like Mr. Hanzad, he had become more in-
volved in public relations and in dissemination of information
than in direct decision making.
He stated that because teachers feel that they are in
a "fishbowl" they are more highly motivated to work harder.
As they have done more work, there has been less for him to
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do. His participation in decision making ua3 limited to fee-
ilitation of others* decisions.
He felt that the organization of his school had been
autocratic before the implementation of the program. Increased
participation in school affairs by teachers and parents had
transformed the organization into a much more democratic one,
in his vieu.
Mr, Uitt of the Cassell School uas openly impressed with
the program and felt that it offered many advantages to stu-
dents, He uas the only principal to comment that the fact
that students uere at the schools by choice seemed to give
them more motivation to learn,
Vouchers had caused his teachers* roles to change.
His opinion is that they are under a fair amount of pressure
to attract students to their programs. He feels that the
teachers have accepted this pressure and used it positively.
Teachers at Cassell spent more time in voluntary planning
sessions during the summer of 1973 than at any previous time.
His oun role had changed in ways similar to those men-
tioned by Mr. Ayers and Mr. Hanzad. Instead of having to run
one school with six hundred students by himself, Mr. Uitt had
four people to run four schools of one hundred fifty each.
His oun job became much more that of an advisor and facilita-
tor. Unlike Mr. Ayers and Mr. Hanzad, Mr. Uitt did not choose
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to spend a great deal of time involved in public relations.
One change which Mr. Uitt was alone in noting was some increase
in paperwork as a result of vouchers. Perhaps the fact that
principals were passing most of their paperwork along to heads
of mini-schools is the reason others did not mention the same
thing.
Mr. Fay was available for a very brief interview. He
seemed to agree in substance with all that has been said by
the three previous principals. He had abdicated a large amount
of responsibility for the operation of the school and had de-
legated it to teachers.
The reason for the brevity of the interview points out
one of the pitfalls which participating may fall into. During
the early part of the summer of 1973, the school had become
overenrolled. Mr. Fay left it to the teachers to decide what
to do with them. The teachers decided that the additional
voucher income seemed attractive and decided to open their
doors to all applicants. The consequence of this decision was
that the school was going to have to move beyond its own
walls and add a number of portable classrooms, but the teachers
did not carefully consider this fact.
In the words of one teacher, "Everyone thought it would
be someone else who*d have to go." During the last week of
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August, 1973, uhen this v/isit took place, several teachers
were furious because they were being transferred from their
former classrooms to portables. ( In the process of trying to
secure an interview/ with them, they told me that they had been
in tears all morning and were not speaking to anyone.)
In this case the diffusion of responsibility meant that
no one is taking any responsibility at all. The combination
of a serious miscalculation by teachers, their principals mic-
calculat ion of their ability to make decisions, and an emotion-
al situation promised to ruin morale for weeks.
Mr. 0*Berg was the most enthusiastic supporter of the
voucher program among the principals. He also had the strong-
est views concerning the effect of vouchers on the roles of
principals and teachers.
He agreed that principals will take on less and less
direct responsbility for decision making. He went further and
predicted that the voucher program may cause the role of the
principal to disappear altogether. He viewed this as a pos-
itive development and sees signs of the dissolution of his
role at his school. His teachers were making more decisions
without consulting him and he was encouraging them to do so.
He felt that his role will shift towards program development
and research, although his title may change.
In his view, the influx of federal funds attached to
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vouchers has had a great effect on his teachers. The money
helped to create fresh possibilities in the minds of his staff.
They were able to take a more creative and positive attitude
toward their students. He observed that teachers were more
conscientious about their work during the first year of voucher
operation than they were previously. He felt that their ap-
proaches to problem solving were more creative and self-re-
liant
.
With only one exception (Mr. Uilkens), principals
uniformly perceived major changes in their roles and in the
roles of their teachers. It appears that vouchers have the
ability to influence management styles. Diffusion of respons-
ibility, democratic decision making, and leadership through
facilitation are the chief hallmarks of vouchers* effects.
It is interesting that principals noticed the decrease
in their direct responsibility much more than teachers noticed
the increase in their oun. Teachers seemed to notice the tan-
gible benefits of vouchers to the exclusion of others.
Twenty teachers were interviewed. There were plans to
interview many more than this number, but the responses of the
initial group were so thoroughly uniform that further inter-
views were deemed unnecessary.
All teachers interviewed felt that parents uere more
involved now than before the introduction of vouchers. Parents
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have always been involved in education in Alum Rock, but had
become even more involved during the preceeding school year.
The only other change which teachers noted was the fact
that there is now a strong steady flow of federal money coming
directly to the schools. In fact, most teachers, when asked
what changes vouchers had produced, spoke in terms of equip-
ment, materials, and other tangibles.
No teachers felt that they were under pressure as a
result of competition, although many claimed that there are
other teachers who are.
It was easy to develop the impression that teachers
were not really giving much thought to their position in the
voucher program. More likely, teachers were simply too busy
with their teaching responsibilities to think about anything
else. In any case, their opinions concerning changes in their
role were not useful to the purposes of the study.
Chapter IV has presented a description of the voucher
operation in Alum Rock, attitudes of upper echelon participants,
and changes in the roles of those on the front lines. Before
turning to a concluding chapter, some space will be devoted to
the findings of the Rand Corporation which were released by
NIE in "Education Vouchers: The Experience at Alum Rock" (1973).
These are the only findings of the Rand Study presently available.
Two surveys were conducted, one in the Fall of 1972, the
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other in the Spring of 1973. The pairs of numbers following
an entry indicate the 1972 and 1973 findings, respectively.
In its survey of parents, Rand found that:
1 • Most parents like the idea of having a choice about
the schools their children attend ( 83%, 95$),
2. Most parents believe that their children get a better
education if their parents select the school they go to (57$,
75*),
3. Most parents believed that giving them a choice makes
teachers more responsive to complaints and suggestions (66$, 76$),
4. By 1973, most parents believed that they should help
to decide about hiring and firing of teachers (36$, 53$), and
of principals (52$, 69$),
5. Most parents believed that vouchers will provide
greater control over their childrens* education (53$, 69$),
and will improve the quality of education they receive (77$,
89$),
6. In both Fall and Spring, parents in Alum Rock were
20$ more satisfied with their schools than was a national
sample, and
7. In the Spring, 25$ of parents believed that the
program offerings of the schools were insufficient, (pp. 9-10).
In its survey of teachers, Rand found that:
1. In 1972, 50$ of teachers believed that vouchers would
In 1973 this figure was 51$. However, inimprove education
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the Spring, teachers in v/oucher schools agreed with the statement
74$ of the time, while only 33$ of teachers in non-voucher schools
agreed. Among teachers joining the program for the first time
in 1973, 56$ agreed.
2. In response to the question "Aside from increased funds,
uhich of the following are the main advantages of the voucher
demonstration?" the following responses were recorded. Teachers
were permitted to make as many responses as they liked.
a. Improved teacher teamwork (75$),
b. Improved curriculum (87$),
c. Student transfer option (66$),
d. Good learning experience for teachers (84$),
e. More authority for teachers ( 67$),
f. Greater opportunity to innovate (96$),
g. Upgrading of teachers* professional role (57$),
h. Greater parent involvement (72$).
3. The following disadvantages were noted:
a. Too many meetings (87$)
b. Pressure from parents (15$).
4. In the Spring, 83$ of the teachers in voucher schools
thought the program was helping students, uhile only 30$ of the
teachers in non-voucher schools thought so.
5. Two-thirds of the teachers believed that parents had
more say in educational matters. (pp# 11-14)
Rand found that principals and administrators felt they
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were acting as facilitators more than previously. They per-
ceived that they uere more actively involved in allocating re-
sources and in helping teachers to plan than before, (p. 14)
Information concerning student achievement uas not
available from Rand since the analysis of achievement test
scores uas not yet completed.
The findings also indicate that some uork needs to be
done in bringing information to parents, although some progress
had been made. In 1972 half the parents did not knou that they
could transfer their children to neu schools. Parents uho had
never heard of the project numbered 17%. This figure had been
reduced to 10% by 1973. By Spring, 1973, 80% of parents under-
stood that they could transfer their children, but 21% still
did not knou uhich program their children uere enrolled, (p. 15)
There is little to comment on concerning these figures.
The information is more precise and more broad than the findings
of this study, but the tuo tend to bear each other out. The
enthusiasm of teachers for the program and the changing role
of administrators are significant points of agreement betueen
the tuo investigations.
The importance of these findings is much smaller to
this study than it uill be to Rand's. They uould have been
quite important if ue could have concluded from our investigation
that a true voucher program uas in operation in Alum Rock.
Chapter V uill outline uhy this conclusion uas not reached.
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CHAPTER \l
CONCLUSIONS
Section 1
An Evaluation of the Alum Rock Project
There is no question that a number of positive changes
have occured in the Alum Rock schools as a result of their
participation in the experimental voucher project. The admin-
istrators of the project, the representatives of the local
teachers* union, and the building principals are in general
agreement that the following changes have occured.
Parental involvement in the schools increased. Parents
became more involved in decision making. They made known to
the mini-schools their desires relating to educational pro-
gramming.
Parental interest in the schools has always been high,
Mr, 0*Berg, one of the principals interviewed, noted that a
school levy has never failed in Alum Rock, In addition, a
survey conducted by his school before the introduction of
vouchers found that 8Q$> of the parents whose children were
attending Goss School felt that they had a voice in directing
the school * s activities. The survey serves to point up the
fact that vouchers have not caused parents to become active
in school affairs. Uhat they have done is provide an
oppor-
tunity for parents to become even more involved
in the educ-
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ation of their children,
A second achievement of the voucher experiment is the
democratization of management in the participating schools.
Only one principal, Mr. Uilkens, reported that his role has
remained unchanged. Teachers have been given the responsibil-
ity for designing educational programs. They have accepted
the responsibility willingly.
The designing of an educational program requires care-
ful long-term planning. When teachers accepted the respons-
ibility for designing their own programs, they necessarily
took upon themselves the burden of performing such planning.
The decisions which teachers had to make in the process of
carrying out their newly expanded duties were decisions which
principals have traditionally had to make. As teachers proved
that they were able to design, plan, and perform adequately,
the principals came more and more to resemble advisors and
facilitators.
In addition, teachers have taken on many of the day
to day managerial responsibilities. Disciplinary functions,
supply functions, and record keeping are responsibilities
which are flowing away from principals and towards teachers.
A third achievement of the voucher experiment is the
creation of diversity in program development and in classroom
design. The field study indicated that there is somewhat
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greater diversity among programs than there uas before the
introduction of education vouchers# Teachers began to ex-
periment with novel program designs as soon as vouchers pro-
vided the funds to do so, (See pp. 114-7,)
Finally, the voucher experiment has enabled teachers
to become more creative in their approaches to instructional
problems. The funds provided by the project have bought the
equipment and materials necessary to make educational creativ-
ity possible.
In every one of these achievements, the voucher exper-
iment is a proximate cause. Parents uere heavily involved in
the schools. Teachers uere aching for the means to use their
creativity in the creation of neu educational programs and in
the development of neu classroom techniques. Both principals
and teachers uere uilling to experiment uith innovative man-
agement techniques.
All these things uere ready to happen. The only pro-
blem uas funding. Local property tax receipts, supplemented
by state and federal grants, uere enough to keep the district
going but no more.
The voucher project provided the funds required to
take the district beyond the subsistence level. Voucher
expenditures in 1972-3 uere $1,700,000. In 1973-4 they uere
$3,000,000. Approximately half of these amounts went to the
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classrooms of participating schools. Given the poverty of the
district, its potential for change, and the purposes of the
funding, it is difficult to imagine that the project would not
produce many benefits.
The funding which the project brought to the district
has produced these benefits, Uhat part have the vouchers
themselves played in the success of the project? The answer
appears to be "very little." The funds to be distributed to
classrooms were divided among the children to be educated
and were called vouchers. Beyond that, they bear no resembl-
ance to the vouchers discussed in Chapters I and II.
In each of the voucher proposals presented on pages
11-13, vouchers were understood to be a result of the division
of a district’s available educational funds among all the
school-aged children in the district. In some cases the value
of a low-income child’s voucher may be increased; in others
the division remains equal. A voucher is not an additional
grant. It is each child’s share of the available educational
budget.
Vouchers were not used in Alum Rock. The community’s
educational funds were distributed as usual, directly to the
schools. Additional federal funds were granted to the schools
in proportion to the number of students attending them.
The difference between these two is not merely semantic.
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Suppose there is a school filled with incompetent teachers.
Suppose also that many members of the community recognize them
as incompetent and choose not to send their children there.
As a result, the school is operating at only half of its
capacity
.
In a true voucher system, this school will not receive
enough funds to keep all of its teachers. Some uill have to
go. The market moves money auay from perceived incompetence
and forces incompetent teachers out of the schools.
In Alum Rock, the school uill receive its full oper-
ating budget. Teachers must be paid. The school uill not
receive as much additional money for materials as others,
but it can continue to operate. In this case, the market is
not permitted to uork against perceived incompetence. The
market can only uithold excess funds.
That Alum Rock*s vouchers have little to do with com-
petition is demonstrated by the fact that there is only one
middle school participating in the program. Federal funds
are being paid to the school in the form of vouchers, but it
is not competing to get them. In any of the seven proposals
presented in Chapter I, the statement "only one school in this
district is participating in the voucher program" uould be
nonsense. Uithin the conceptual framework of a true voucher
system, such a statement cannot be taken seriously.
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The same statement can be made in Alum Rock because
the word "voucher" is being used entirely differently.
Other differences between the Alum Rock project and
current voucher models have been commented on previously
(see pp, 67-76). The only one of these to be treated here
is the fact that no private schools may participate in the
Alum Rock program. If no private schools are participating,
one wonders if there is any need for vouchers at all, either
in the Alum Rock sense or in the usual sense. A completely
public system can be operated much more simply.
The city of Tacoma, Washington has recently adopted a
free choice system. Parents may send their children to any
school in the city provided there is room. Children who wish
to stay in their neighborhood school are guaranteed a place
in it. The city supplies transportation. Budgetary adjust-
ments are made when needed to insure that all children have
equal educational facilities.
The Tacoma system is not a voucher system and no one
has claimed that it is. Yet, if federal funds were removed
from the Alum Rock program, it would resemble Tacoma*s free
choice system in every important detail.
The Alum Rock project has many fine achievements to
its credit. Unfortunately, providing a working model for
future voucher plans is not one of them.
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Section 2
The Current Status of Vouchers
The controversy uhich surrounds the topic of education
vouchers has moved from the educational journals to the state
legislatures. Fifteen states have considered implementing
voucher programs. Opposition from the NEA and the AFT has
been strong and consistent. Proponents of voucher plans have
been able to score only one victory,
Ross (1973) reports the following legislative action.
In California, the legislature rejected a bill uhich would
have established a five year experimental voucher project
which would have permitted parents to send their children to
any public or private school of their choice.
The Connecticut legislature passed a bill which permits
six districts to apply to the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare for scholarship funds. The program is called a
voucher program. Since it has no relationship to vouchers
as understood here, passage of this bill is in no way a victory
for voucher proponents.
The state of Delaware was considering a bill which
would have authorized a statewide voucher program permitting
non-public schools to participate. The bill was stricken
from the calendar.
An administrative decision has been made in Hawaii
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to observe developments in voucher programs in other states,
but not to participate for the present.
In Kansas, the legislature defeated a bill which would
have authorized the state to grant vouchers worth $300 to
students attending schools teaching courses approved by the
state board of education.
The Maryland legislature passed a bill which permitted
the state to aid non-public schools through voucher payments.
After passing the legislature the bill was presented to a
general referendum and was defeated by the voters.
In 1972 the Massachusetts legislature asked for a
report on the feasibility of adopting a voucher plan open to
all schools. The report was not received by the prescribed
date and the measure automatically failed. The State Supreme
Court ruled that the measure would have been unconstitutional.
If parochial schools were made ineligible, the Court thought
the bill would be acceptable.
The Missouri legislature rejected a bill which would
have permitted tuition reimbursement to private school students
through the use of vouchers.
In New York, a study on the feasibility of implementing
a voucher plan was submitted to the legislature, but no action
was taken.
The Ohio legislature has authorized a committee to
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study the possibility of developing a voucher plan in the state.
In Tennessee, a bill uhich uould have authorized the
state to use vouchers as part of the state program to aid local
districts uas rejscted by the legislature.
In 1972, the Texas legislature authorized a study on
vouchers to be undertaken. The report uas due by the end of
the 1973 session, but no committee uas appointed.
The Uest Virginia legislature defeated a bill uhich
uould have authorized a voucher plan uhich included private
schools
.
A committee of the Uisonsin legislature has completed a
report on education vouchers uhich had not been submitted at the
time of Ross* report.
The only state uhich has shoun a uillingness to exper-
iment uith vouchers is Neu Hampshire. Seven districts have
applied to the National Institute of Education for planning
grants in order to become more fully informed as to the probable
impact of a voucher test. The results of the study uill be
presented to the people of the districts for approval in March,
1975. If approved, proposals for implementation uill be pre-
sented in Washington. The test uill not take place until
September, 1975 and then only in those districts uhich vote to
test the concept. Information regarding the proposed test uas
made available by William H. Milne, Neu Hampshire Voucher Project
Director
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If there are no administrative problems, the Neu Hamp-
shire project will begin in September, 1975. It offers the
hope that a true voucher plan can be tested and the results
evaluated. If the theoretical considerations in the first
part of this paper are valid, there is every reason to believe
that the Neu Hampshire project uill be successful.
The proposal for Neu Hampshire vouchers most closely
resembles the CSPP Proposal. The value of a voucher uill be
determined by dividing the communities* educational resources
by the number of students to be educated, uith one important
proviso. Any additional expense incurred by an influx of private
school students uill be absorbed by the federal government.
For example, a community of 5,000 students, 1,000 of
uhom attend private schools, uill continue to fund its 4,000
public school students. The federal government uill fund the
private school students uhoseschools participate in the test,
provided that the private schools are non-sectarian. In this
uay, vouchers uill represent each student's share of the
available educational budget. In Alum Rock, it uill be recalled,
vouchers represented a share of a federal grant, the school
budgets remaining unchanged.
The present timetable for implementing the program
indicates that the first year of testing, 1975-6, uill
involve
only public schools. During 1976-7 and thereafter,
non-sectarian
private schools are eligible to participate. The
safeguards
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against discrimination, including an EVA
,
which are so much an
essential part of the CSPP Proposal, are reproduced in the Neu
Hampshire plan. If the various projects in Neu Hampshire are
implemented and if they reproduce the conditions projected by
the CSPP model, the participating communities will provide ar
excellent test of the validity of the principles which are the
foundation of the CSPP plan.
If New Hampshire can demonstrate that the use of educ-
ational vouchers can invigorate the educational enterprise, it
is possible that some of the legislative action reported will
be reversed. Whether education vouchers are to be the wave of
the future or another passing fashion may be known in a few
years. The idea deserves to be tested.
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